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The Naval Postgraduate School Center for Information Systems Security Studies 
and Research (CISR) is designing and developing a distributed multilevel secure (MLS) 
network known as the Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA).  MYSEA will permit 
the delivery of unmodified commercial off the shelf productivity software applications 
and data from a large number of single-level network domains (e.g., NIPRNET, 
SIPRNET, JWICS) to a trusted distributed operating environment that enforces MLS 
policies.  The analysis and development of a communications framework necessary to 
support connections between multiple MLS servers and a set of high assurance network 
appliances supporting simultaneous access to multiple single level networks and their 
concurrent connection management is required to fulfill the goal of MYSEA. 
To enable this functionality, modifications to the existing MYSEA server, the 
development of a new high assurance communications security device - the Trusted 
Channel Module (TCM), and the implementation of a trusted channel between the 
MYSEA server and the TCM is required.  This document specifies a framework for 
incorporating the high level design of the TCM, several trusted daemons and databases, 
plus the incorporation of a trusted channel protocol into MYSEA to enable a distributed 
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1. Connected Single Level Network (CSLN):  The segment of the MYSEA 
architecture from the MYSEA server to its associated TCMs responsible for multiplexing 
a large number of single level networks into one MLS network interface on the MYSEA 
server. 
2. Information Assurance:  “Measures that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of 
information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities“ [1]. 
3. Inter-TSF Transfers: “Communicating data between the TOE and the 
security functions of other trusted IT products“ [2]. 
4. Inter-TSF Trusted Channel: “Provides for the secure communication of 
user or TSF data between the TOE and another trusted IT product“ [3].  
5. Internal TOE Transfer:  “Communicating data between separated parts of 
the TOE Security Function (SF):  A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon 
for enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP“ [2]. 
 xv
6. Reference Monitor:  “The concept of an abstract machine that enforces 
TOE access control policies“ [2]. 
7. Sensitivity Level:  The combined classification of data based upon its 
security or classification level and integrity level. 
8. Target of Evaluation (TOE):  “An IT product or system and its associated 
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation“ [2]. 
9. TOE Security Functions (TSF):  “A set consisting of all hardware, 
software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement 
of the TSP“ [2]. 
10. TOE Security Functions Interface (TSFI):  “A set of interfaces, whether 
interactive (man-machine interface) or programmatic (application programming 
interface), through which TOE resources are accessed, mediated by the TSF, or 
information is obtained from the TSF“ [2]. 
11. TOE Security Policy (TSP):  “A set of rules that regulate how assets are 
managed, protected and distributed within a TOE“ [2]. 
12. Trusted channel:  A means by which a TSF and a remote trusted IT product 
can communicate with necessary confidence to support the TSP [2]. 
13. Trusted Channel Module:  Security device required to enable “Inter-TSF 
Trusted Channels” between the MYSEA server and its authorized single level network. 
14. Trusted Path:  “A means by which a user and a TSF can communicate with 
necessary confidence to support the TSP“ [2]. 
15. Trusted  Network  Interpretation (TNI):  “Provides  interpretations  of  the 
Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)  appropriate  for  evaluating  a 
network  of  computer  and communication devices as a single system with a single 
Trusted Computing  Base  (TCB),  called the  Network  Trusted Computing Base 
(NTCB), which is physically and logically partitioned among the components of  the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis documents the analysis and development of a communications 
framework between multiple multilevel security (MLS) servers and a set of high 
assurance network appliances to support simultaneous access to multiple single level 
networks and their concurrent connection management.  This thesis describes the 
necessary modifications to an existing MLS architecture, the requirements for 
development of a new high assurance communications security device, and further 
analysis and validation of an existing secure communications protocol to enable the 
functionality described above.  Furthermore, this thesis will expand on efforts to create a 
trusted distributed operating environment that enforces MLS policies while continuing to 
support unmodified commercial off the shelf productivity software.  Ultimately, this 
communications framework will permit the delivery of applications and data from a large 
number of single-level network domains (e.g., NIPRNET, SIPRNET, JWICS) to a MLS-
enabled enclave. 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. MYSEA Historical Overview 
The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) focuses MLS research at the 
Naval Postgraduate School Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research (CISR).  These 
efforts began in the late 1990s in response to unfulfilled Department of Defense (DoD) 
MLS requirements and are captured in several documents [5] [6] [7] [8].  These 
unfulfilled MLS requirements have forced the DoD to support multiple system high 
networks, resulting in duplication of equipment, wasted manpower resources, exploding 
costs and reduced situational/tactical awareness.  Research into MLS solutions may 
eventually enable MYSEA to provide the DoD with a deployable heterogeneous network 
solution, running at multiple classification levels while continuing to support 
commercial-off-the-shelf equipment and applications at the client end.  
The current MYSEA is designed to provide a high assurance distributed MLS 
networking environment based upon a small set of high assurance security devices that 
are nearly transparent to the end user.  This virtually transparent security architecture 
2 
permits clients to continue using the commercial-off-the-shelf (e.g., Microsoft Windows, 
Linux, and Intel) and government off the shelf operating systems and applications to 
which the end user has already been trained and is accustomed to operating.  The current 
architecture utilizes three primary components to deliver its MLS environment: thin 
clients, an MLS Server and a Trusted Path Extension Device (TPE) as illustrated in 
Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1.   Current MYSEA Architecture 
The prototype end user device is an Intel based platform running a Microsoft 
Windows XP or Linux diskless thin client, which is loaded with a standard commercial 
and government off the shelf package of applications at each user log-in.  The client will 
have the capability to transition through multiple sensitivity levels of information with the 
3 
aid of the TPE.  The client will remain in a diskless configuration so that no long-term 
memory storage is resident on the client after each transition.  
The MYSEA server is a DigitalNet XTS-400 MLS server running the Secure 
Trusted Operating Program (STOP) 6.1 [9], previously evaluated at class B3 under the 
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [10].  This operating system is 
currently undergoing a Common Criteria Evaluated Assurance Level (EAL) 5+ 
evaluation [2].  The STOP enforces MLS policies by using mandatory access controls 
(MAC) and discretionary policies with discretionary access controls (DAC).  MAC and 
DAC policy enforcement is governed by the rules articulated in the Bell and LaPadula 
(BLP) security model [11] and in the Biba integrity model [12].  The BLP model shows 
how a secure state can be maintained by preventing unauthorized disclosure of 
information while the Biba integrity model shows how a secure state can be maintained 
by preventing the unauthorized modification of data. 
Additionally, the STOP enforces DAC.  This feature enables an owner of an 
object to explicitly control access to that object from other subjects.  The STOP provides 
granular control over seven DAC modes including read and write.  It also maintains 
permissions for the owner and groups authorized by the owner, as well as global 
permissions. 
Responsible for interfacing each untrusted client to the MLS server and 
facilitating a true distributed MLS environment is the TPE device [5].  The TPE currently 
runs as a prototype on an open source operating system but will migrate to the Trusted 
Computing Exemplar (TCX) [13] high-security kernel under development at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  The TCX project aims to develop a high assurance separation 
kernel targeted for a Common Criteria EAL 7 evaluation.  The TPE has a handheld form 
factor and extends the trusted path [3] of the MLS server through the MLS LAN.  This 
functionality enables the user on an untrusted workstation to authenticate and negotiate a 
session at any authorized sensitivity level with the MYSEA server.  Once logged-in at 
their authorized sensitivity level, a user will be able to access data at all sensitivity levels 
dominated by their current sensitivity level.  In other words, if a user is logged-in at TOP 
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SECRET, they will have read and write access at TOP SECRET and read access to all 
sensitivity levels below TOP SECRET in compliance with the BLP and Biba models. 
The MYSEA server has a limited number of physical network interfaces used to 
enhance its connectivity to MYSEA clients, LANs and networks.  The MYSEA 
configured XTS-400 currently has four physical network interfaces to provide its 
connectivity with the possibility of expanding to sixteen network interfaces.  One 
network interface is dedicated to the MLS LAN while the three remaining network 
interfaces are allocated to dedicated single level networks simulating current DoD 
architectures (e.g., JWICS, SIPRNET, NIPRNET, COIN).  Each single-level network 
facilitates connectivity to an existing network infrastructure, thus permitting the use of 
these pre-existing networks to facilitate connectivity and interoperability with existing 
programs of record.  Currently, each network interface is administratively assigned a 
dedicated sensitivity level corresponding to the requirements set forth for that single-level 
network (e.g., SIPRNET = SECRET/HIGH INTEGRITY).  As a result, all 
communications traversing the network interface are assigned the proper sensitivity level 
by the STOP. 
2. Requirement to Expand Single Level Network Capability 
Although the possibility of connecting fifteen separate single-level networks to 
the MYSEA Server appears more than adequate, further research into the requirements 
for providing a true MLS environment reveals that number to be woefully inadequate.  
Williams and Day’s critical analysis of “Sensitivity Labels and Security Profiles” [14] 
provides a mere glimpse into the nearly countless number of possible labeling 
combinations used by the DoD, its Coalition partners and contractors, and other U.S. 
Government entities.  Likewise, Lipner’s article on “Non-Discretionary Controls in 
Commercial Applications” [15] highlights the same issue in the private sector.  With a 
multitude of existing single-level networks, the finite number of available MYSEA server 
network interfaces becomes a resource reserved only for the most significant single-level 
networks.  This limitation impacts a true MLS environment by preventing the MLS hub 
from being fully connected to all levels of information.  This inhibits the consolidation of 
information at one central location, negating the near real-time power of linking  
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repositories of critical information.  The net result is a reduced ability to perform true 
fusion analysis and collaborative planning, which decreases situational and tactical 
awareness. 
Recognition of this limitation generated a new requirement for MYSEA to expand 
the functionality of each network interface from a dedicated single-level network 
interface to a true MLS network interface capable of multiplexing multiple sensitivity 
levels of traffic.  As the TPE extended the trusted path from the MYSEA Server to the 
MYSEA client, a new security device is also necessary to create a trusted channel [3] 
from the MYSEA server to each single-level network.  With the creation of a trusted 
channel, it becomes possible to create an MLS network interface capable of managing 
and multiplexing a large number of single-level networks.  This security device shall be 
known as the Trusted Channel Module (TCM), and its position in the MYSEA 
architecture is illustrated in Figure 2.  Hereafter, the MYSEA segment that encompasses 
the trusted channel from the MYSEA server to the TCM will be known as a Connected 
Single Level Network (CSLN).  The establishment of a trusted channel requires a 
Protected Communications Channel (PCC) Protocol to ensure that all communications 
between the MYSEA server and TCM are protected.  Based upon the IPsec protocol 
suite, the PCC protocol will provide confidentiality, integrity and authenticity, satisfying 
the trusted channel requirements defined by the Common Criteria.  Finally, 
implementation of the trusted channel will require additional processes running on the 
MYSEA server to manage the trusted channel communications. 
3. Distributed MLS Network 
Creating MLS network interfaces on the MYSEA server to provide multiple 
simultaneous trusted channels to multiple TCMs yields a new level of complexity for 
MYSEA.  This new architecture produces an innovative distributed MLS network design.  
Although MYSEA pioneers new ground in its approach to creating a distributed MLS 
network, two other pioneering works exist to provide historical insight on developing 
secure distributed architectures.  These two projects were developed in the late 1980s 
when the TCSEC [10] was the basis for assurance evaluation.  Sufficient differences exist 
between TCSEC and Common Criteria terminology, particularly when trying to draw 
similarities between a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) and a Target of Evaluation (TOE) 
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Security Function (TSF).  Additionally, the TCSEC Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) 
incorporated the term Trusted Network Interface [4] for which there exists no Common 
Criteria equivalent.  The TNI provided a guideline for evaluating a TCB distributed 
architecture of individually evaluated products as one complete system. 
 
Figure 2.   MYSEA Architecture Incorporating TCM 
 
“The Architecture of a Distributed Trusted Computing Base,” [16] by Fellows et 
al., first introduced the underlying concepts concerning the successful implementation of 
a distributed MLS architecture.  The authors explored five primary areas of focus when 
building a distributed MLS network.  First, the system shall account for a “fragmented 
TCB (Trusted Computing Base) domain.”  In other words, the distributed nature of all 
security devices within the MLS architecture complicates the ability to track and maintain 
state over all security functions within the system.  Therefore, distributed systems shall 
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account for the delay and state transitions of the remote security components.  Second, 
the architecture shall maintain “trusted paths between TCB components.”  MYSEA 
maintains a trusted path between the MYSEA Server and its users through the TPE.  The 
advent of the Common Criteria introduces new terminology to replace the term trusted 
path when describing data flows over distributed networks.  The term trusted channel is 
introduced to differentiate the subtle difference between it and trusted path.  For 
MYSEA, trusted path is interpreted to mean when the communication is from a human to 
a trusted system and trusted channel is interpreted to mean when the communication is 
between trusted systems [2].   Regardless of the terminology, the overarching principle is 
that an unforgeable link shall be maintained between the MLS server and other trusted 
devices within the network. 
Third, the system shall invoke “trusted protocols” to ensure end-to-end security of 
the trusted channel.  These “trusted protocols” typically use cryptography.  Fourth, the 
system shall implement “hierarchical trusted computing bases.”  This requirement 
maintains that at all times one central security device shall have a reference monitor 
capable of maintaining the integrity of the “multilevel secure environment.”  Fifth, the 
system shall be constructed with “fault tolerance.”  This requirement maintains that with 
any distributed MLS environment, if one of the security devices fails, it will “fail-secure” 
to prevent any compromise of the system or its data.  Furthermore, fault tolerance may 
include the distribution of data and processing within the TCB to prevent the failure of 
one device from becoming a denial of service on the entire network  
 Fellows’ paper presents two further traits of distributed MLS architectures, known 
as “entelechy” and the “∆ (change) property.”  As defined by Fellows, “the entelechy 
component of the security policy states that a host may send or receive messages over a 
crypto connection only if it has current access to that crypto connection.”  Entelechy is 
further explained as an important component of a distributed MLS architecture, because 
so much of the trusted security policy decision-making process is incorporated into 
trusted software.  Therefore, entelechy becomes a critical factor in enforcing the overall 
security policy of the system.  The “∆ property” specifies that any security-related 
modification to the MLS distributed architecture shall only be made by trusted agents 
explicitly authorized to make said modifications. 
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 Wiessman, in a paper entitled “BLACKER: Security for the DDN” [17], provided 
the second work which helped lay the foundations for a distributed MLS architecture.  
Wiessman first presented this paper in 1986, detailing the implementation of a secure 
host-to-host communication system for the Defense Data Network.  Although the focus 
of the paper is based upon how best to build a TCSEC Class A1 level communications 
system, one notable trait instrumental for the success of a distributed MLS system is the 
capability to establish a trusted path.  Weissman states that by blending both computer 
security (COMPUSEC) and communications security (COMSEC) principles, a 
“cryptographic seal” can be established between security devices, thus expanding the 
TCB across all security devices. 
B. COMMON CRITERIA IMPACT ON HIGH ASSURANCE 
DEVELOPMENT 
1. PalME Project 
Development of high assurance systems requires meticulous planning, detailed 
analysis, and complete oversight of the entire system lifecycle process.  The Common 
Criteria is the international standard for secure systems development.  It provides a 
formalized set of functional and assurance security requirements necessary to achieve a 
desired level of evaluated security for any product.  The Common Criteria permits 
tremendous flexibility for system designers to specify the level of security functionality 
and assurance their product requires and provides a detailed blueprint for how to achieve 
that security.  Monika Vetterling and Guido Wimmel’s paper on “Secure Systems 
Development Based on the Common Criteria: The PalME Project” [18] details the 
benefits of secure systems development in conformance with the Common Criteria.   
PalME demonstrated that incorporating a Common Criteria developmental 
framework from the conception of a project ensures analysis into the areas of threat, 
threat mitigation and residual risk.  Additionally, the Common Criteria provides a set of 
accepted functional and assurance security requirements that, if implemented from the 
inception a project, will both focus and streamline product development by integrating 




2. Trusted Channel Module Development 
 Common Criteria development principles will be used in the development of the 
TCM.  Currently, no specific protection profile (PP) exists to aid in this development.  
However, the “Consistency Instruction Manual for Development of U.S. Government 
Protection Profiles for use in Medium Robustness Environments” [19] establishes an 
initial baseline, which will be used for TCM development.  Given this guideline, a high-
level analysis of the threats, objectives and assumptions necessary to develop the TCM 
will be presented.  Two additional documents will aid in the development of the TCM.  
The “ST for Cisco IOS/IPsec” [20] provides useful information for analyzing the 
fundamental network security elements necessary to establish a trusted channel based 
upon IPsec.  Second, the “U.S. Government Protection Profile for Separation Kernels in 
Environments Requiring High Robustness – Version 0.621” [21] provides the separation 
kernel blueprint instrumental to the development of the TPE and TCM security devices. 
3. Terminology 
The following terms are used in accordance with the ISO definitions 
contained in ISO/IEC Directives Part 2, Rules for the structure and 
drafting of International Standards:” “Within normative text, the verbs 
”shall”, ”should”, ”may”, and ”can” have the ISO standard meanings. [2]  
C. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
1. Introduction 
 Chapter I defines the overall purpose of this thesis and provides the necessary 
background to understand distributed MLS architectures.  It also provides an outline 
covering the remaining chapters and appendixes. 
2. MYSEA Connected Single Level Network Management Framework 
 Chapter II defines the MYSEA CSLN management framework required to 
securely connect a large number of CSLNs to a single MLS network interface. 
3. Protected Communications Channel Protocol 
 Chapter III reinforces the initial PCC findings denoted in “A Trusted Connection 
Framework for Multilevel Secure Local Area Networks” [5].  It will further define PCC 




4. The MYSEA Trusted Channel Module 
Chapter IV provides high level analysis of the TOE threat, objective and 
assumptions that a TCM must satisfy.  It also discusses the development of the TCM in 
terms of Common Criteria guidelines. 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
 Chapter V summarizes the findings set forth in this thesis concerning distributed 
MLS architectures.  Additionally, it provides a context for future work related to 
expanding the functionality of MYSEA. 
D. APPENDIX OVERVIEW 
1. Appendix A:  Connected Single Level Network Systems Requirements 
Document 
 Appendix A critically analyzes all requirements necessary to incorporate CSLNs 
into MYSEA.  These requirements will be broken down into three subsections covering 
the MYSEA server, TCM and CSLN operations applicable to both devices.  
2. Appendix B:  Protected Communications Channel Protocol 
Requirements Document 
 Appendix B provides a detailed analysis concerning the protocol requirements 
necessary to implement a trusted channel within the MYSEA architecture. 
3. Appendix C:  Trusted Channel Management Requirements Document 
 Appendix C provides a detailed analysis of the CSLN architecture required to 
support labeling of all CSLN connections.  Detailed analysis will be provided on trusted 
channel management operations. 
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II. MYSEA CONNECTED SINGLE LEVEL NETWORK 
MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
The CSLN architecture encompasses all hardware, firmware and software 
necessary to create a trusted channel from the MYSEA server to the TCM.  The trusted 
channel provides the foundation for all CSLN operations and is the principle mechanism 
for providing a distributed MLS architecture between the MYSEA server and the 
associated TCMs.  The MYSEA server will act as a master in a master/slave relationship 
with each associated TCM.  The MYSEA server will enforce all security policy decisions 
concerning the assigned sensitivity level of each CSLN and will maintain ultimate 
authority for permitting or denying all communications between itself and the CSLNs.  
This hierarchical CSLN architecture is an essential element for creating a distributed 
MLS environment according to Fellows [16].  It ensures that at all time, one central 
security device maintains a reference monitor capable of maintaining the integrity of the 
distributed MLS network environment.   
The CSLN architecture will permit MYSEA to multiplex a large number of 
single-level networks, each operating at its own dedicated sensitivity level through one 
MLS network interface.  The trusted channel will provide the MYSEA server with the 
underlying integrity mechanisms required to extract an implicit sensitivity level from all 
inbound CSLN connections to the MYSEA server and use that information to generate an 
explicit sensitivity level for all MAC based decisions.  The trusted channel will also 
provide the MYSEA server with the necessary mechanisms to ensure all outbound 
connections destined to a CSLN are directed only to that CSLN. 
As stated by both Fellows and Weissman, establishing a trusted channel is the 
principle element necessary to create a distributed MLS architecture.  The trusted 
channel is responsible for permitting only authorized connections between the TCM and 
the MYSEA server.  High level TCM requirements for establishing a trusted channel are 
presented in Chapter III. 
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This chapter will discuss how CSLN management functions are implemented in 
hardware, firmware and software.  The high-level design requirements and specification 
data can be found in Appendix A [22] and C [23] of this thesis. 
A. CONNECTED SINGLE LEVEL NETWORK ARCHITECTURE 
COMPONENTS 
A CSLN consists of three components as depicted in Figure 5: 1) the MYSEA 
server; 2) the TCM; and 3) an untrusted networking device.  The MYSEA server running 
on the XTS-400 is the central point of control mediating all accesses to data at different 
security levels.  The TCM will serve as the primary interface between an authorized 
single-level network and the MYSEA server.  A networking device will permit the 
multiplexing of a large number of TCMs into one MLS network interface on the MYSEA 
server.   
 
Figure 3.   MYSEA CSLN Architecture 
One additional set of components may be added to the CSLN architecture to 
provide additional COMSEC.  Type I, NSA approved encryption devices could be used 
to cover CSLN communications links where the TCM is geographically separated from 
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the MYSEA server trusted physical environment.  Although many configurations of a 
Type I modified architecture exist, one possible implementation is presented in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.   CSLN with Remote TCM Augmented with Type I Encryption  
 
1. MYSEA Server 
The DigitalNet XTS-400 hardware architecture and the STOP provide the security 
foundation for the MYSEA server.  The XTS-400 is currently undergoing an EAL 5+ 
certification.  This certification confers a high degree of confidence that the XTS-400 
correctly enforces its TOE Security Policy (TSP) [2].   The XTS-400 leverages the four 
domain architecture of the Intel Pentium chip to fortify the STOP with hardware based 
security mechanisms [9].  Figure 5 illustrates the synergistic security relationship 
between the Pentium and STOP architectures.  The x86 four protection domain 
architecture permits the separation of STOP trusted and untrusted operations at the 
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Figure 5.   STOP / Intel Pentium Architecture Relationship [9] 
Domain 0 is responsible for enforcing all security kernel operations and maintains the 
reference monitor.  The reference monitor is “an abstract machine that enforces TOE 
access control policies [2] and is responsible for ensuring no software process with less 
privilege can run with kernel level privileges.  All user level processes running in 
Domain 3 are forced to interact with the STOP through Domain 2.  Domain 2 provides an 
interface which mediates all user level access to the trusted domains of operation in the 
STOP.  Combined with the STOP security functions, the Intel hardware domain 
separation between privilege levels provides a high degree of confidence that untrusted 
user level processes cannot escalate their privilege and thus tamper with STOP trusted 
processes for the purpose of subverting the system.  
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2. Trusted Channel Module 
The TCM is the integral piece of hardware necessary to create a trusted channel 
through the MYSEA server MLS network interface to a single-level network.  The TCM 
will be developed with the goal of achieving an EAL 6 certification.  At present, it 
remains in the high level design phase.  The TCM will also incorporate the Intel x86 four 
domain architecture.  However, specific form factor hardware requirements remain 
unidentified and are left for future work.  
3. Networking Device 
The CSLN architecture will require an untrusted dumb hub or smart switching 
device to multiplex two or more CSLNs to a single MLS network interface on the 
MYSEA server.  Although this device may yet have an EAL, the current generation of 
networking devices is not evaluated as high assurance and will ultimately be the weakest 
link in the CSLN architecture.  A dumb hub would permit a possible intruder to sniff all 
packets on the network.  However, the device does not provide any intelligence for an 
intruder to subvert the device and hence directly interact with or possibly redirect 
packets.  Although packet sniffing introduces a possible risk, it will be mitigated by the 
CSLN trusted channel which provides packet level confidentiality and integrity.  These 
security elements will provide data protection against a possible intruder gaining 
intelligence from packet sniffing. 
A smart switch would provide the CSLN the ability to stop packet collisions at the 
networking device which provides for much greater network efficiencies.  Smart 
switching devices also prevent an intruder from sniffing all packets on the network.  
However, an untrusted smart network switching device presents the possibility for 
malicious activity (e.g., denial of service and packet redirection) via subversion of the 
device.  Once again, the CSLN trusted channel provides packet level confidentiality and 
integrity and thus provides data protection against a possible intruder gaining intelligence 
from packet sniffing or redirection. 
Both devices have networking and security strengths and weaknesses.  Given the 
networking efficiencies gained by using a smart switch and the risk mitigation provided 
by invoking the trusted channel, the smart switch is recommended for use.  However, the 
16 
MYSEA certification and accreditation authority will make the ultimate decision based 
upon the evaluated risk to the architecture. 
4. Type I Encryption Device 
The CSLN architecture is flexible enough to allow for a TCM that is 
geographically dislocated from the trusted physical environment of the MYSEA server.  
However, IPsec Type II cryptographic algorithms do not currently meet DoD Type I 
requirements for the protection of classified data.  Therefore, if a TCM is utilized external 
to the MYSEA server trusted physical environment, then Type I approved encryption 
devices are required to cover all communications between the two devices. 
B. CONNECTED SINGLE LEVEL NETWORK SOFTWARE MODULES 
Modifying MYSEA to incorporate MLS network interfaces requires the 
development of several custom software modules on both the MYSEA server and TCM.  
The MYSEA server will require the ability to extract and use an implied sensitivity level 
from each inbound connection and ensure each outbound request destined for a single-
level network is at the authorized sensitivity level.  The MYSEA server and the TCM will 
require the ability to manage trusted channel connections by initiating and receiving PCC 
protocol requests.  The TCM will require the ability to perform network address 
translation (NAT) [24] on all inbound and outbound packets.  The correct implementation 
of these software modules will permit MYSEA to deliver a distributed MLS network. 
Fellows and Weissman’s elements for establishing a secure distributed MLS 
architecture are all enforced in software, of which, accounting for the fragmented TCB 
requirement is the most difficult to capture.  The Common Criteria does not provide a 
mechanism for evaluating a distributed TSF.  Specifically, the Common Criteria does not 
permit us to evaluate the TSF of the MYSEA server in a context where the trusted 
channel extends its TSF to include the TCM.  To overcome this limitation, separate TSFs 
are developed for the MYSEA server and the TCM to ensure they both enforce separate 
TSP that permits them to discount the state and delay of the other device while 
maintaining their own secure state.  Separate TSFs mandating each device maintain its 
own independent secure state also addresses Fellows’ fault tolerance requirement for 
distributed MLS architectures.  By ensuring each security device can independently 
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maintain a secure state, any fault introduced into the system will be systematically 
handled by both security devices.  This functionality ensures that any faults lead to a fail-
secure state by both devices. 
Fellows’ Entelechy property and the use of trusted protocols to ensure the end-to-
end security of the trusted channel are additional elements required to deploy a 
distributed MLS architecture.  The trusted channel will be based upon the PCC protocol, 
which will be invoked in software and provide confidentiality.  The PCC protocol 
operates as a trusted process in the IP stack providing end-to-end security for all CSLN 
connections and will provide the encryption mechanism and key management necessary 
to enforce Fellows’ Entelechy property.  Wiessman further reinforces the notion that 
encryption is one of the key elements necessary to establish a trusted channel. 
Specifically, he stipulates that an absolute requirement for protecting a distributed MLS 
environment is the establishment of a trusted path (trusted channel) through the use of a 
crypto-seal. 
Fellows’ ∆ property adds one further requirement necessary to create a distributed 
MLS architecture.  The correct and tamperproof administration of the MYSEA server and 
TCM is imperative if MYSEA is to maintain a secure state.  Only authorized security 
administrators will be allowed to create the initial state necessary to begin MYSEA 
operations.  Likewise, administrative modifications to the MYSEA server and the TCM 
will only be permitted by authorized security administrators.  The TCM will provide no 
user-level interface to the trusted processes and database necessary to operate CSLN 
connections. 
1. MYSEA Server 
The MYSEA server is responsible for the enforcement of all security decisions 
regarding the correct handling of all data running at multiple sensitivity levels.  Two new 
trusted daemons and three new trusted databases are required to implement this 
functionality: a Trusted Channel Server (TCS); a Secure Connection Server (SCS); a 
Trusted Channel Database (TCDB), a Secure Connection Inbound Database (SCIDB) and 
a Secure Connection Outbound Database (SCODB).  Additionally, modification to the 
current IP stack to support the PCC protocol is required to enable the trusted channel.  
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a. Trusted Channel Server 
The TCS will be responsible for two critical CSLN functions.  First the 
TCS will manage a proprietary MYSEA Security Association protocol necessary to 
initiate and terminate each trusted channel through the PCC protocol.  This protocol will 
be similar in function to the Internet Key Exchange, Version 2 (IKE2) protocol [25], but 
with a simpler, streamlined implementation.  High level design details concerning the 
MYSEA security association protocol are found in Appendix B of this thesis [26].  
Second, the TCS will be responsible for associating an explicit sensitivity level to all 
inbound connections and will be responsible for performing sensitivity level equivalence 
checks on all outbound CSLN connections. 
The TCS will receive the implicit sensitivity level of each inbound 
connection from the PCC protocol handler to derive an explicit sensitivity level for that 
connection.  The data and explicit sensitivity level will be recorded in the SCIDB for use 
by the SCS.  The TCS will query the SCODB for the explicit sensitivity level of each 
outbound connection and ensure the requested single-level network has an equivalent 
sensitivity level.  The TCS will work in concert with the TCDB to conduct these 
equivalency checks. 
b. Secure Connection Server 
The SCS is a trusted daemon that lies between the TCS and the application 
protocol servers running on the MYSEA server.  The SCS listens on specified ports for 
all connection attempts and maintains dual responsibilities with respect to the direction of 
each received connection request.   For an inbound connection, the SCS will use 
information stored in the SCIDB for assigning an explicit sensitivity level to each 
application protocol server it spawns as a result of the incoming connection.  For an 
outbound connection, the SCS extracts the destination IP address of each connection and 
the sensitivity level of the requesting application protocol server and writes the data to the 
SCODB for use by the TCS.   
c. Trusted Channel Database 
The TCDB is a static database that maintains a record consisting of the IP 
address of each TCM (the implicit sensitivity level), the explicit sensitivity level linked to 
the TCM and the IP address space of the associated single-level networks for which the 
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TCM is responsible for providing security services.  The TCDB provides read-only 
access to the TCS to enable this trusted daemon to determine the explicit sensitivity level 
of each connection. 
d. Secure Connection Inbound Database 
The SCIDB maintains a record consisting of the original source IP address 
of each inbound connection and the explicit sensitivity level of the TCM.  The SCIDB is 
both read and written by the TCS and is read-only for the SCS.  The TCS receives the IP 
address of the TCM and the original source IP address of the original packet from the 
PCC protocol handler on each inbound connection.  The TCS queries the TCDB to 
ensure that the connection is from an authorized TCM and to retrieve the explicit 
sensitivity level of the authorized TCM.  The TCS proceeds to write both the explicit 
sensitivity level of the TCM and original source IP address to the SCIDB for later use by 
the SCS.  The TCS is responsible for deleting each record in the SCIDB upon connection 
termination.  The SCS reads the record of each connection from the SCIDB and spawns 
the requested application protocol server at the explicit sensitivity level of the CSLN. 
e. Secure Connection Outbound Database 
The SCODB maintains a record consisting of the destination IP address of 
each outbound connection and the sensitivity level of the originating application process.  
The SCODB grants the SCS write access to create a record for each outbound connection 
and read access to check the created record so that all subsequent packets directed toward 
that connection do not need an additional entry in the database.  The SCODB grants the 
TCS read access to perform a sensitivity level equivalence check before permitting the 
SCS to send the outbound connection request into the networking stack for further 
processing.  The SCODB grants the TCS write access so that a record can be deleted 
upon termination of the connection. 
f. Protected Communications Channel Protocol handler 
The PCC protocol is the primary enabler necessary to establish a trusted 
channel between the MYSEA server and TCM.  As identified in Chapter III and further 
detailed in Appendix B of this thesis [26], the PCC protocol is an IPsec conformant 
protocol in accordance with the “Security Architecture for Internet Protocol, Draft-IETF-
IPsec_RFC 2401bis” [27].  IPsec provides the basic information assurance (IA) tenets of 
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authentication, confidentiality, integrity and anti-reply, all of which are necessary to 
provide trusted channel communications.  Invoking these tenets of IA permits the 
MYSEA server to leverage two critical features provided by the trusted channel.  First, 
they make possible the ability to ascertain an implied sensitivity level for all inbound and 
outbound MYSEA server communications by establishing an unforgeable, authenticated 
link between the MYSEA server and TCM.  The implied sensitivity level of each CSLN 
is directly linked to the IP address of its TCM.  By binding the implicit sensitivity level to 
the IP address of its TCM, the TCS receives the data necessary to authenticate the 
sensitivity level of each connection.  Second, they provide a mechanism to enforce data 
segregation for all connections between the MYSEA server and each of its associated 
TCMs. 
The PCC protocol handler running on the MYSEA server will operate as 
prescribed by the “RFC 2401bis” in the host system IP stack.  However the PCC protocol 
will implement a custom API in order to extract the source IP address from the inner and 
outer headers of each packet and subsequently pass that extracted data to the TCS to 
derive the explicit sensitivity level of the connection.  The TCS will be required to 
respond to this request before each packet may proceed. 
2. Trusted Channel Module 
The TCM provides the basic networking and security functionality required to 
connect the MYSEA server to a large number of CSLNs.  The TCM will provide a secure 
interface between the MYSEA server and its associated single-level network by 
establishing a trusted channel for all inbound and outbound connections.  The TCM will 
utilize the CISR high assurance TCX kernel to enforce its TSP.  Two trusted daemons are 
required for the TCM to facilitate trusted channel services to the MYSEA server.  These 
two daemons are the TCS and the NAT server.  Furthermore, the TCM requires the 
implementation of the PCC protocol to bind the trusted channel between itself and the 
MYSEA server.  The IPsec and NAT functions on the TCM are defined in more detail in 
Chapter III and in Appendix B of this thesis [26].  Further explanation of the high level 
design of each daemon is found in those sections. 
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a. Trusted Channel Server 
Similar to the MYSEA server, the TCM will implement a TCS to manage 
the proprietary MYSEA Security Association protocol necessary to initiate and terminate 
each trusted channel through the PCC protocol.   
b. Network Address Translation Server 
The TCM will perform NAT on all inbound and outbound packets.  The 
NAT server will perform destination NAT on all inbound packets and source NAT on all 
outbound packets.  This functionality will allow the MYSEA architecture to not only 
mask the IP space of its CSLNs, but will also permit MYSEA to comply with current 
DoD policy, which mandates the separation between unclassified and classified IP space 
domains (e.g., NIPRNET, SIPRNET, JWICS, etc…).  Furthermore, The Defense 
Information Systems Agency “SIPRNET Classification Guide” [28] prohibits divulging 
the association of a classified IP address to its name or system to a domain of lower 
classification.  To overcome the networking issues created by this policy, the TCM will 
perform NAT operations on all packets entering and exiting the CSLN. 
c. Protected Communications Channel Protocol 
The TCM will implement a “RFC 2401bis” IPsec conformant protocol 
using the proprietary MYSEA Security Association protocol, which will be discussed in 
Chapter III and Appendix B of this thesis [26].  No special API will be necessary as the 
TCM does not perform any sensitivity level processing and thus does not need to be 
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III. PROTECTED COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL PROTOCOL 
A. OVERVIEW  
The MYSEA PCC protocol was first introduced in “A Trusted Connection 
Framework for Multilevel Secure Local Area Networks” [5].  The PCC protocol was 
initially designed to establish a trusted path between a TPE device and the MYSEA 
server to support authentication, confidentiality and integrity for all MYSEA MLS LAN 
communications.  Several communications security protocols were analyzed as 
candidates for the PCC protocol.  Based upon several factors which are discussed in 
Section III A, the IPsec protocol [27] was recommended to be the underlying engine 
enabling the PCC protocol.  Although the PCC is a critical element of the MYSEA 
architecture, it has yet to be designed and implemented.  This document and Appendix B 
of this thesis [26] are intended to formalize the high level design requirements for the 
PCC protocol. 
The CSLN architecture also requires the use of the PCC protocol.  Many elements 
of the originally recommended PCC protocol remain valid for establishing a trusted 
channel between the MYSEA server and the TCM.  As discussed in Chapter II and 
further defined in Chapter IV, a trusted channel also requires authentication, 
confidentiality and integrity.  The PCC protocol design specifications for CSLN 
operations have the following additional requirements.  The PCC protocol will require 
the use of a security gateway device (i.e., TCM) that can securely interoperate with the 
MYSEA server.  Both the MYSEA server and the TCM will be able to initiate the trusted 
channel.  The PCC protocol will require a protocol that can facilitate layer 4 and above 
communications.  The PCC protocol will incorporate anti-replay protection mechanisms 
to provide protection from maliciously retransmitted packets on the CSLN.  These 
additional PCC protocol requirements reinforce the selection of IPsec as the best 
candidate protocol for establishing a trusted channel within the CSLN architecture.  The 




B. IPSEC PROTOCOL 
IPsec was selected as the basis for the MYSEA PCC protocol due to its flexibility, 
scalability and security features, allowing the PCC protocol to meet all trusted channel 
requirements as defined by the Common Criteria.  Not only does IPsec provides 
authentication, confidentiality and integrity mechanisms, but it also includes protection 
against replay attacks and a security policy database (SPD) that permits/denies all 
connections based upon a strictly defined set of parameters.  Additionally, IPsec is 
virtually transparent to all protocols above layer 3 [27], which permits IPsec to 
seamlessly transport all layer 4 and above communications.  IPsec uses the SPD in 
concert with the Security Association database (SAD) to govern all communications 
flow.   
1. Security Policy Database 
The IPsec protocol handler controls access to each network interface by making 
an explicit decision concerning each inbound and outbound packet.  The IPsec SPD 
defines the rules on how each packet is processed.  Based upon a set of parameters 
specified by a security administrator in the SPD, IPsec either discards or permits each 
packet.  For permitted packets, the security parameters contained in the SPD are used to 
determine whether the packet is processed by the IPsec protection mechanisms or 
whether it is permitted to bypass those mechanisms and freely pass to the next layer.  The 
SPD maintains an ordered access control list with router-like specificity.  This list is used 
to analyze the attributes of each packet and determine the appropriate action for that 
packet (e.g., permit with IPsec protection, permit without IPsec protection or discard).  If 
the appropriate action for a packet is to permit with IPsec protection, then information 
about the cryptographic algorithms designated for use will also be found in the SPD.  The 
IPsec protocol handler will use the data from the SPD to construct a new security 
association for that connection in the Security Association Database (SAD) – defined in 
the next section.  
The SPD is a trusted database with write access being strictly limited to only the 
security administrator.  Entries in the SPD are based upon the overall security policy for 
all connections permitted or denied into the host device.  The SPD should be configured 
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before connecting the host device to an untrusted network and should deny all 
connections that are not expressly permitted.  The SPD contains selectors that are 
equivalent to the access control lists found in a stateless network boundary layer 
protection device (e.g., router or firewall).  At a minimum, the SPD filters on the source 
and destination IP address and any designated data found at or above the IP layer (e.g., 
TCP, UDP, ICMP, ports, etc…).   
The integrity of the SPD and SAD is critical to the secure operation of each IPsec 
connection.  The authority to administer the IPsec SPD will be strictly controlled by the 
security administrator in compliance with the ∆ property.   
2. Security Association Database 
The SAD is a dynamic database that stores the parameters necessary for the IPsec 
protocol handler to apply the cryptographic algorithms on an active IPsec connection.  A 
SAD record is created by the IPsec Security Association (SA) protocol, later discussed in 
Chapter III.B.5.  Upon the initial set-up of an IPsec connection, the SA protocol handler 
negotiates the values necessary to enable the authentication, encryption and integrity 
security services afforded by IPsec.  Once negotiated, these values are stored in the SAD 
so that all further IP packets traversing the connection can utilize the existing SA and 
avoid the overhead of additional SA negotiation.   
3. Modes of Operation 
IPsec can operate in two distinct modes of operation: 1) Transport Mode; and 2) 
Tunnel Mode.  Transport Mode is generally implemented when connections are between 
two end point devices.  The Transport Mode header retains the header of the original IP 
packet and therefore provides no protection against basic traffic analysis.  Figure 6 
illustrates the packet transformation in transport mode using the Encapsulating Security 
Protocol to provide both confidentiality and integrity protection on the packet.   Tunnel 
Mode is implemented when at least one of the security devices is a security gateway.  
Tunnel Mode affords the security gateway the ability to provide additional traffic flow 
protection by masking the original IP header through encryption.  A Tunnel Mode IPsec 
Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP) packet is illustrated in Figure 7 which implements 
both confidentiality and integrity – ESP will be explained in Chapter III.B.4.  MYSEA 
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will utilize Tunnel Mode to maximize security protection mechanisms between the 
MYSEA server and its associated TCMs.  Tunnel Mode will permit the CSLN to provide 
full protection for every original IP packet flowing through the CSLN. 
 
Figure 6.   Transport Mode IPsec Packet using ESP Protocol 
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Figure 7.   Tunnel Mode ESP IPsec Packet 
 
4. IPsec Security Protocols 
MYSEA will incorporate the IPsec security services necessary to establish a 
trusted channel.  IPsec provides its cryptographic security services through the 
implementation of the Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP) and the Authenticating 
Header (AH) protocol.  The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Protocol [29] provides 
authentication, confidentiality and integrity for an IP packet.  However, ESP does not 
provide complete integrity protection for an IPsec packet because its leaves the original 
IP header unprotected in Transport Mode and the new IP header unprotected in Tunnel 
Mode as illustrated in Figures 6 and 7.  If either the Transport or Tunnel Mode IP header 
is left unprotected, malicious actions (e.g., IP spoofing, redirects, etc...) against the 
header may adversely impact the integrity of the trusted channel.  This deficiency is 
unacceptable in the CSLN architecture as the implicit sensitivity level of each packet is 
directly tied to the TCM’s IP address, which is located in the new IP header.  The 
integrity protection deficiency inherent to ESP can be overcome by encapsulating the 
ESP packet in the Authenticated Header (AH) Protocol [30].  AH provides packet 
authentication and integrity to every field in the IPsec packet, less some mutable values 
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found in the IP header (e.g., TTL value), as illustrated in Figure 8.  The combination of 
these two security protocols is required for MYSEA to provide a trusted channel and 
protect against malicious actions affecting the authentication, confidentiality, or integrity 
of CSLN communications. . 
 
Figure 8.   AH/ESP Tunnel Mode Protected Packet 
 
5. Security Association and Key Management 
IPsec provides two methods for negotiating a Security Association (SA) and 
managing cryptographic keys.  The simplest method is a manual SA configured with 
static SA management variables and cryptographic keys.  This method typically 
incorporates the use of pre-selected symmetric keys to be used in conjunction with its 
cryptographic algorithms.  Although the manual method presents the easiest solution for 
establishing an IPsec security association, its key management architecture lacks the 
ability to scale with large, highly distributed network architectures.  Additionally, IPsec 
loses its ability to provide anti-replay protection with the use of manual security 
associations as it does not allow for a connection by connection negotiation of a unique 
counter necessary to prevent replay attacks. 
Automated SA and key management provides the second method for negotiating 
new security associations and managing cryptographic keys.  Automated SA 
management provides IPsec the capability to scale with large network implementations, 
to negotiate its anti-replay protection mechanisms and to create several distinct SAs 
between the same two hardware devices.  The IKE2 protocol [25] is the standard for 
IPsec automated SA negotiation and key management.  However, IKE2 introduces 
unneeded complexity and negotiation overhead into MYSEA.  As a result, MYSEA will 
use a proprietary automated SA and key management algorithm to bootstrap each IPsec 
connection.  This algorithm will use a simplified, custom key exchange protocol that will 
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take advantage of the master/slave relationship between the MYSEA server and TCM.  
The MYSEA SA protocol will use public key cryptography digital certificates to secure 
the initial SA setup.  The MYSEA server alone will be responsible for key generation and 
distribution to its associated TCMs on a connection-by-connection basis.  The reason for 
implementing a proprietary automated SA and key management algorithm is two-fold.  
First, this protocol will reduce the IKE2 connection negotiation overhead.  Second, this 
protocol will reduce the size and complexity of the SA mechanism.  This will contribute 
to its understandability, thus making it appropriate for a high assurance implementation.  
Details concerning the automated key exchange protocol for MYSEA are found in 
Appendix B of this thesis [26].   
6. IPsec Cryptographic Algorithms 
Part of the rich set of security services delivered by IPsec is the choice of 
implementing one of several cryptographic confidentiality and integrity algorithms.  
Nevertheless, MYSEA will streamline the security association process by only using the 
strongest cryptographic algorithms available for IPsec integration.  Currently, the 
National Institute for Technology (NIST) standard for providing confidentiality is the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-128-CBC) algorithm [31].  The NIST standard for 
integrity is the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) [32].  Applying these two algorithms 
together through the ESP and AH security protocols provides IPsec the ability to 
facilitate authentication, confidentiality and integrity for all packets transiting the 
protected network interface.  In the future, MYSEA will continue to adopt the strongest 
cryptographic algorithms available for integration.  If for any reason, one or both of these 
algorithms are found to be vulnerable to a cryptographic attack, then MYSEA will 
quickly move to adopt an accepted replacement algorithm. 
7. IPsec Placement 
The flexible nature of IPsec allows for designers to choose from one of three 
possible implementations.  The most advantageous implementation is the embedment of 
IPsec code into the native operating system IP stack.  This implementation permits IPsec  
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to operate more efficiently.   However, native integration of IPsec into the existing 
operating system requires the ability to access and modify the existing source code from 
the IP stack.   
A “bump-in-the-stack” (BITS) design is an alternative method for integrating 
IPsec into an operating systems IP stack.  BITS permits designers to integrate IPsec into 
the local networking stack when access to the operating source code is unavailable.  BITS 
inserts IPsec into the local networking stack between the IP layer and the local network 
drivers in the data link layer. 
A “bump-in-the-wire” (BITW) design is used when an external device enables the 
IPsec functionality.  Typically, a BITW design refers to the use of a separate security 
gateway device (e.g., router or firewall) with its own IP address to implement IPsec.  A 
BITW design may also be used internal to a host-based system through the use of a 
custom IPsec cryptographic module.   
The CSLN requires the integration of IPsec in both the MYSEA server and TCM.  
By definition, the TCM will use the BITW method for delivering IPsec services, but 
more specifically, IPsec will be natively integrated into the operating system IP stack of 
the TCM.  If possible, the MYSEA server should use a native IPsec integration as well.  
If a native integration proves impossible due to a lack of access to the source code of the 
operating system, then the MYSEA server may use a "bump-in-the-stack" (BITS) IPsec 
integration. 
C. RESIDUAL RISK 
The IPsec protocol provides authentication, confidentiality and integrity, which 
are all required for creating the trusted channel necessary to enable CSLN operations.  
Nonetheless, some residual risk remains in the architecture.  First, although IPsec tunnel 
mode hides the IP address of the originating host, basic traffic analysis can still occur 
against the packets transiting the CSLN.  Heavy traffic transiting to one single-level 
network or another may provide insight into special intelligence events or operations.  It 
should be noted that the DoD has already accepted this risk with its implementation of 
the current generation of IP encryptors.  Second, the CSLN may permit the creation of 
covert channels by manipulating the mutable fields of the IP header.  This vulnerability 
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could lead to the leakage of classified data into the CSLN.  Finally, IPsec implements 
Type II cryptographic algorithms.  Current DoD policy requires the use of Type I 
algorithms to protect classified data [33]. 
Although mitigation techniques exit to reduce the risk associated with these 
vulnerabilities, future work for MYSEA architects should include a detailed vulnerability 
analysis and determination of the best method for mitigating the risk.  This analysis 
should be followed with a reasoned risk management decision to accept or not accept the 
remaining residual risk, if any.  
D. SUMMARY 
The CSLN architecture requires the implementation of a PCC protocol in order to 
provide a trusted channel as delineated by the Common Criteria.  The IPsec protocol 
satisfies all trusted channel requirements and is chosen as the basis for the PCC protocol.  
By combining the IPsec ESP and AH security protocols, the PCC will provide 
authentication, confidentiality and integrity to every packet traversing the CSLN.  The 
use of tunnel mode will permit the attachment of an implicit sensitivity level to these 
packets by directly associating the IP address of the TCM to the connection.  The 
proprietary security association and key management protocol will afford MYSEA a 
streamlined and provable method for bootstrapping each IPsec connection.  The 
culmination of the IPsec security functionality will afford data separation between each 
packet arriving and departing the MYSEA server at multiple sensitivity levels.  
Furthermore, this security functionality will enable the MYSEA server to provide an 
MLS network interface, which in turn creates the capability to provide a truly distributed 
MLS network architecture. 
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IV. THE MYSEA TRUSTED CHANNEL MODULE 
Development of the TCM will be in accordance with the Common Criteria.  
However, complying with the full spectrum of requirements necessary to generate a 
formal Security Target is beyond the scope of this thesis.  This chapter only provides a 
general description of the threats, objectives and assumptions necessary to design the 
TCM.  The term Target of Evaluation (TOE) refers to the entire TCM, which may be 
composed of several components, some of which may have their own TOE. 
As previously discussed in Chapter I, three documents provided the guidance for 
developing this threats and objectives analysis: The “Consistency Instruction Manual for 
Development of U.S. Government Protection Profiles for use in Medium Robustness 
Environments” [19]; the “ST for Cisco IOS/IPsec” [20] ; and the “U.S. Government 
Protection Profile for Separation Kernels in Environments Requiring High Robustness – 
Version 0.621” [21].  
A. TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
1. Assumptions 
The following table list the assumptions made concerning the TOE environment. 
 
A.PHYSICAL [21] It is assumed that the IT environment 
provides the TOE with appropriate physical 
security commensurate with the value of 
the IT assets protected by the TOE. 
A.TRUSTED_INDIVIDUAL [21] If an individual is allowed to perform 
procedures upon which the security of the 
TOE may depend, it is assumed that the 
individual is trusted with assurance 
commensurate with the value of the IT 
assets. 
A.TRAINING [20] As the security functions of the TOE can be 
compromised due to errors or omissions in 
the administration of the security features of 
the TOE, it is assumed that administrators of 
the TOE have been trained to enable them to 




A.TRUSTED-CA [20] As the security functions of the TOE when 
configured to use digital certificates can be 
comprised if the Certificate Authority (CA) 
that issued the certificates is not operated in a 
trusted manner, it is assumed that if the TOE 
is configured to use digital certificates, the 
issuing CA is trusted or evaluated to at least 
the same level as the TOE. 
 
Table 1.   Security Usage Assumptions 
 
2. Threats 
The following table provides a sketch of the threats anticipated against the TOE 
environment. 
 
T.ADMIN_ERROR [21] An administrator may incorrectly install or 
configure the TOE (including the 
misapplication of the principle of least 
privilege to limit the damage that can result 
from accident, error, or unauthorized use), 
or install a corrupted TOE resulting in 
ineffective security mechanisms. 
T.ALTERED_DELIVERY [21] The TOE may be corrupted or otherwise 
modified during delivery such that the on-




The TOE may be placed in an insecure 
state as a result of unsuccessful recovery 
from a system failure or discontinuity. 
T.COVERT_CHANNEL_EXPLOIT Unauthorized data may be tunneled 
through the TOE.  
T.CRYPTO_COMPROMISE [21] A malicious subject may cause key, data or 
executable code associated with the 
cryptographic functionality to be 
inappropriately accessed (viewed, 
modified, or deleted), thus compromising 
the cryptographic mechanisms and the data 
protected by those mechanisms. 
T.INSECURE_STATE [21] When the TOE is initially started or 
restarted after a failure, the security state of 




T.POOR_DESIGN [21] Unintentional or intentional errors in 
requirements specification or design of the 
TOE may occur, leading to flaws that may 
be exploited by a malicious subject. 
T.POOR_IMPLEMENTATION [21] Unintentional or intentional errors in 
implementation of the TOE design may 
occur, leading to flaws that may be 
exploited by a malicious subject. 
T.POOR_TEST [21] Lack of or insufficient tests to demonstrate 
that all TOE security functions operate 
correctly (including in a fielded TOE) may 
result in incorrect TOE behavior being 
undiscovered. 
T.ATTACK [20] An attacker (whether an insider or outsider) 
may gain access to the TOE and compromise 
its security functions by altering its 
configuration. 
T.AUDIT_COMPROMISE [19] A malicious user or process may view audit 
records, cause audit records to become or 
modified, or prevent future audit records 
from being recorded, thus masking a user’s 
action 
T.REPLAY [19] An IT entity may gain inappropriate access 
to unauthorized data traversing the CSLN 
by replaying IP packets through the 
network. 
T.RESOURCE_EXAUSTION [19] A malicious IT entity may block access to 
the trusted channel by exhausting the 
resources on the TOE required to initiate a 
new connection. 
T.SPOOFING [19] A malicious IT entity may misrepresent 




A malicious unauthorized IT entity may 
cause TSF data or executable code to be 
inappropriately accessed (viewed, modified 
or deleted) 
 
Table 2.   Anticipated Threats Against TOE 
 
3. Organizational Security Policies 




P.ADMIN_ACCESS [19] Administrators shall be able to administer 
the TOE locally through the protected 
communications channels 
P.ACCOUNTABILITY [21] The TOE shall provide the capability to 
make available information regarding the 
occurrence of security relevant events. 
 
P.CRYPTOGRAPHY [21] The TOE shall use NIST FIPS validated 
cryptography as a baseline with additional 
NSA-approved methods for key 
management (i.e., generation, access, 
distribution, destruction, handling, and 
storage of keys) and for cryptographic 
operations (i.e., encryption, decryption, 
signature, hashing, key exchange, and 
random number generation services). 
P.LEAST_PRIVILEGE [21] The TOE shall be designed such that the 
principle of least privilege is applied to 
limit the damage that can result from 
accident, error or unauthorized use. 
P.RATINGS_MAINTENANCE [21] A plan for procedures and processes to 
maintain the TOE’s rating must be in place 
to maintain the TOE’s rating once it is 
evaluated. 
P.SYSTEM_INTEGRITY [21] The TOE shall provide the ability to 
periodically validate its correct operation 
and, with the help of administrators if 
necessary, it must be able to recover from 
any errors that are detected. 
P.ADMIN_GUIDANCE [21] The TOE shall provide documentation and 
training regarding the correct use of the 
TOE security features. 
P.VULNERABILITY_ANALYSIS 
_AND_TEST [21] 
The TOE must undergo independent 
vulnerability analysis and penetration 
testing to demonstrate that the TOE is 












B. SECURITY OBJECTIVES 
1. Security Objectives for the TOE 
The following security objectives will enable the TOE to counter known threats 




The TOE will ensure that subjects gain 




The TOE will provide administrators with 
the necessary information for secure 
management of the TOE. 
O.AUDIT_GENERATION [21] 
 
The TOE will provide the capability to 
detect and generate audit records for 
security relevant auditable events. 
O.AUDIT_PROTECTION [19] The TOE will provide the capability to 
protect audit information. 
O.CHANGE_MANAGEMENT [21] 
 
The configuration of, and all changes to, 
the TOE and its development evidence 
will be analyzed, tracked, and controlled 
throughout the TOE’s development. 
O.CORRECT_BOOT [21] 
 
The TOE will provide mechanisms to 
correctly transfer the TSF implementation 




The TOE will provide a capability to test 
the TSF to ensure the correct operation of 
the TSF during normal operation. 
O.COVERT_CHANNEL_ANALYSIS [21] 
 
The TOE will undergo appropriate covert 
channel analysis to demonstrate that the 




The TOE will support separation of the 
cryptography from the rest of the TSF. 
O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_SERVICES [21] 
 
The TOE will use cryptographic 
mechanisms to protect the integrity of 
TOE code and data as it resides within the 
system and when it is transmitted to other 
systems. The TOE will also use 
cryptographic mechanisms to verify the 
integrity of the TSF code and 
configuration data during initialization. 
The cryptographic mechanism will use 
NIST FIPS validated cryptography as a 
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baseline with additional NSA-approved 
methods. 
O.DISPLAY_BANNER [19] The TOE will display an advisory 
warning regarding use of the TOE. 
O.DOCUMENT_KEY_LEAKAGE [19] The bandwidth of channels that can be 





The TOE will undergo independent 
security functional testing that 
demonstrates the TSF satisfies the 
security functional requirements. 
O.INSTALL_GUIDANCE [21] 
 
The TOE will be delivered with the 
appropriate installation guidance to 
establish and maintain TOE security. 
O.INTERNAL_LEAST_PRIVILEGE [21] 
 
The entire TSF will be structured to 
achieve the principle of least privilege 
among TSF modules. 
O.MAINTENANCE_MODE [19] The TOE shall provide a mode from 
which recovery or initial startup 
procedures can be performed. 
O.MANAGE [21] 
 
The TOE will provide all the functions 
necessary to support the administrative 
users and authorized subjects in their 
management of the configuration data, 
and restrict these functions from use by 
unauthorized subjects. 
O.PROTECT  [21] 
 
The TOE will provide mechanisms to 
protect services and exported resources. 
O.RATINGS_MAINTENANCE [21] 
 
Procedures and processes to maintain the 
TOE’s rating will be documented. 
O.RECOVERY [21] 
 
Procedures and/or mechanisms will be 
provided to assure that recovery, such as 
from system failure or discontinuity, is 




The TOE will maintain a domain for its 
own execution that protects itself and its 
resources from external interference, 
tampering, or unauthorized disclosure. 
O.REPLAY_DETECTION [19] The TOE will provide a means to detect 
and reject the replay of TSF data 
traversing the CSLN. 
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION [21] 
 
The TOE will ensure that any information 
contained in a protected resource is not 




The TOE will provide mechanisms that 
mitigate attempts to exhaust TOE 
resources (e.g., system memory and 
processing time). 
O.ROBUST_TOE_ACCESS [19] The TOE will provide mechanisms that 
control a user’s logical access to the TOE 
and to explicitly deny access to specific 
users when appropriate. 
O.SECURE_STATE [21] 
 
The TOE will provide mechanisms to 
transition the TSF to a secure state during 
start-up.  The TSF will be designed to 
maintain a secure state. 
O.SELF_PROTECTION [19] The TSF will maintain a domain for its 
own execution that protects itself and its 
resources from external interference, 
tampering or unauthorized disclosure. 
O.SOUND_DESIGN [21] 
 
The TOE will be designed using sound 
design principles and techniques. The 
TOE design, design principles and design 




The implementation of the TOE will be 
an accurate instantiation of its design. 
O.THOROUGH_FUNCTIONAL_TESTING 
[19] 
The TOE will undergo appropriate 
security functional testing that 
demonstrates the TSF satisfies the 
security functional requirements. 
O.TRUSTED_DELIVERY [21] 
 
The integrity of the TOE must be 
protected during the initial delivery and 
subsequent updates, and verified to ensure 
that the on-site version matches the 
master distribution version. 
O.TSF_INTEGRITY [21] 
 
The TOE will be able to verify the 
integrity of the TSF code and data. 
O.USER_GUIDANCE [21] 
 
The TOE will provide users with the 





The TOE will undergo independent 
vulnerability analysis and penetration 
testing to demonstrate the design and 
implementation of the TOE does not 
allow attackers with high attack potential 
to violate the TOE’s security policies. 
 
Table 4.   TOE Security Objectives 
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2. Security Objectives for the Environment 
The following table specifies the security objectives for the environment, which 
are not directly countered by the TOE security objectives or by the organizational 




Physical security will be provided for the 
TOE by the IT environment commensurate 




If an individual is allowed to perform 
procedures upon which the security of the 
TOE may depend, that individual is trusted 
with assurance commensurate with the 
value of the IT assets. 
 




V. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION 
A. FUTURE WORK 
MYSEA is an ambitious project with several ongoing research efforts.  The 
research presented in this document provides the focus for several future research 
initiatives that will serve to enhance both the security and capabilities of MYSEA.  These 
research initiatives were considered beyond the scope of this document.   
1. Formal TCM Security Target 
This document provides the initial high-level functional requirements for the 
TCM.  The next logical step is the detailed design of the TCM using a formal Common 
Criteria Security Target methodology.  Furthermore, this design should identify the form 
factor requirements necessary to host the TCM 
2. TCM Fail-Over 
To ensure a robust CSLN design, a fail-over mechanism should be incorporated 
into future versions of the TCM.  This fail-over design could emulate the Hot Standby 
Routing Protocol (HSRP) currently fielded by Cisco Systems Inc.  This functionality will 
ensure the failure of a single TCM does not cripple connectivity to a critical single-level 
network [34]. 
3. Single-Level Network User Identification and Authentication 
The current CSLN architecture only permits identification and authentication of 
the single-level network to the level of the corresponding CSLN.  As a result, individual 
users accessing the MYSEA server from the single-level network cannot currently be 
authenticated.  Sound security policy dictates that all interactions with the MYSEA server 
should be associated with a sensitivity level and an authenticated user.  Future versions of 
the CSLN architecture should include a mechanism for identifying each individual user 
accessing the MYSEA server from a single-level network through the CSLN.   
4. MYSEA Security Association Protocol 
MYSEA intends to design and develop a proprietary Security Association 
Protocol to perform the initial binding of all PCC connections.  Although a high level 
40 
design of that protocol is presented in this document, future work should include a 
thorough security analysis of the protocol followed by its low level design and 
development. 
5. MLS IP Encryptors 
Implementing a trusted channel at the physical layer would not require the 
development of a PCC protocol or a TCM.  It would require the addition of separate, 
external gateway security devices located on the physical wire in front of the MYSEA 
server and its associated single-level networks.  Several commercial and government 
virtual private network security devices are strong candidates to implement a Layer 1 
solution.  National Security Agency approved Type I IP layer encryption devices 
currently exist and would satisfy all security requirements necessary to implement a 
trusted channel.  The use of these Type I certified devices would mitigate the residual risk 
inherent in utilizing Type II approved devices.  Additionally, the use of Type I encryption 
devices would allow the MYSEA server to directly connect to any geographically distant 
packet switched single-level network.  
Two major problems currently prevent the implementation of a Layer 1 security 
solution.  First, the present generation of Type I IP encryptors is not certified to handle 
MLS data streams.  Certification to handle an MLS data stream is a requirement for any 
Type I encryptor processing MYSEA server communications.  Second, the Type I 
encryptor would lie outside the TSF of the MYSEA server and thus provide no trusted 
mechanism to associate an explicit sensitivity level to the incoming connection.  An 
explicit sensitivity level could be extracted from the implied sensitivity level associated 
with the original source IP address of the packet, but this implementation could be 
compromised by IP spoofing the original source IP address inside the untrusted single-
level network.  With no mechanism to authenticate that the packet was not compromised 
by IP spoofing, a Layer 1 solution using existing devices would leave the CSLN 
architecture with considerable residual risk. 
Nonetheless, MLS Type I IP encryptors are a long-term requirement for the DoD.   
Future work for MYSEA should include reassessing the CSLN architecture upon the 
certification of these devices.  Depending upon the features incorporated into an MLS 
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Type I encryptor, MYSEA may have the opportunity to streamline its CSLN architecture 
and increase its security posture by using this device and its associated cryptographic 
algorithms. 
6. MLS Server-to-MLS Server Connectivity 
This document provides an architecture for connecting an MLS server to a large 
number of single-level networks.  In the future, MYSEA will transition to a distributed 
MLS network, which relies upon several MLS servers each of which is able to manage 
data at different sensitivity levels.  To meet this goal, MYSEA requires an extension to 
the PCC protocol to support sharing of data at different sensitivity levels securely 
between MYSEA servers. 
7. Protected Communications Channel Residual Risk Analysis 
As discussed in Chapter III C, the PCC protocol cannot mitigate all risk 
associated with the use of a trusted channel.  Further risk analysis should be conducted 
on the possibility of exploiting the PCC through the use of basic traffic analysis, covert 
channels, and the execution of Type II cryptographic algorithms.  All of these potential 
vulnerabilities have known risk mitigation techniques that should be studied and applied 
to the CSLN architecture.  Through this analysis, an intelligent risk management decision 
can be made concerning any residual risk associated to the CSLN architecture. 
B. CONCLUSION 
This document proposes an extension to the current Monterey Security 
architecture to support simultaneous connection management and protection in a 
distributed MLS environment.  Two previous works were instrumental to understanding 
the design requirements for this research.  First, Wilson’s, “A Trusted Connection 
Framework for Multilevel Secure Local Area Networks” [5] provided the underlying 
knowledge critical to understanding how the MYSEA server provides its security 
services.  Second, Fellows’ paper entitled “The Architecture of a Distributed Trusted 
Computing Base” [16] provided the fundamental knowledge required to create a 
distributed MLS architecture.  
The ultimate goal of MYSEA is to field a confederation of MLS servers capable 
of sending and receiving multiple MLS data streams.  However, the current DoD 
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architecture is tied to a substantial number of system high, dedicated and compartmented 
single-level networks that will remain operational until a robust, provable MLS 
architecture is fielded.  This document describes an architecture that serves to provide a 
bridge between the current multiple single-level network architectures and the MLS 
network architecture of the future.  Contemporary MLS server technologies are restricted 
in their ability to connect to a large number of single-level networks by their limited 
number of physical network interfaces.  This constraint prevents the situational awareness 
gained by fusing data from a large number of single-level networks on a central MLS 
server.  The architecture presented in this document permits the MYSEA server to 
overcome its limited number of dedicated network interfaces by providing an MLS 
network interface capable of supporting a large number of single-level networks. 
This architecture is enabled by modifying the existing MYSEA server, creating 
the TCM and by providing a trusted channel between these two security critical devices.  
The trusted channel is the key component for creating a distributed TSF between the 
MYSEA server and TCM.  The PCC protocol, based on the IPsec protocol, is responsible 
for creating the trusted channel.  The PCC protocol binds the security tenets of 
authentication, confidentiality and integrity to all CSLN communications. The security 
mechanisms provided by the trusted channel permit the MYSEA server to extract an 
implied sensitivity level from each connection by positively authenticating each 
associated TCM to the MYSEA server.   
The MYSEA server requires the addition of several trusted daemons and 
databases to enforce the CSLN TSP.  These daemons and databases ensure that the 
implicit sensitivity level of all inbound trusted channel communications is bound to a 
known explicit sensitivity level before access to services on the MYSEA server is 
authorized.  Furthermore, these daemons and databases ensure that all outbound 
communications are permitted only to a CSLN with a sensitivity level equivalent to that 
of the originating MYSEA server process. 
The TCM functions as a security gateway by bridging all communication between 
its associated single-level network and the MYSEA server.  The TCM serves as a trusted 
end-point for all trusted channel communications with the MYSEA server.  This 
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functionality permits the MYSEA server to positively authenticate each TCM and as a 
result, associates an implicit sensitivity level with all communications traversing the 
TCM. 
The MYSEA server, TCM and MYSEA trusted channel work in concert to 
support a distributed MLS environment.  These components enforce all connection 
management and trusted channel security requirements necessary for the MYSEA server 
to provide an MLS network interface capable of supporting a large number of single-
level networks.  The integration of this functionality into MYSEA will enable a truly 
distributed MLS architecture capable of linking current DoD single-level networks to a 
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Extending the initial design requirements for the Monterey Security Architecture 
(MYSEA) is the purpose of this systems requirements document.  These requirements 
were initially identified in “A Trusted Connection Framework for Multilevel Secure 
Local Area Networks” [1].  This document conforms to the original Systems 
Requirements Document outline, where possible, and modifies the document to account 
for dissimilar requirements when necessary.  Common Criteria standards and 




This document delineates new MYSEA requirements necessary to extend the 
functionality of the MYSEA server to allow simultaneous protected access to a large 
number of single level networks at different sensitivity levels while providing 
simultaneous management of all connections.  Some of these networks will be 
multiplexed through a single multilevel security (MLS) network interface on the MYSEA 
server.  The creation of a Trusted Channel Module (TCM) security device capable of 
establishing a trusted channel component is the key enabler for this functionality.  This 
document establishes the requirements essential to launch a trusted channel.  Satisfying 
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2. SYSTEMS OVERVIEW 
2.1 MYSEA DISTRIBUTED MLS ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW 
MYSEA is intended to demonstrate the feasibility of a certifiable MLS 
architecture.  This architecture will provide the end user with commercial-off-the-shelf 
form, function and features while enforcing high assurance security services with a 
minimum number of high assurance security components.  This architecture is envisioned 
to consist of a federation of MLS servers with each server supporting a MLS local area 
network (LAN) and a large number of Single-Level Networks (e.g., NIPRNET, 
SIPRNET, JWICS).  Currently, the MYSEA prototype comprises one main segment 
featuring a MLS LAN.  The MLS LAN encompasses the MYSEA server and a set of 
untrusted thin clients, each having a dedicated Trusted Path Extension (TPE) device.  The 
TPE provides a trusted path interface to the MYSEA server, enabling the user to utilize 
the untrusted client to access server data and services at any authorized sensitivity level.  
This functionality distributes the Target of Evaluation (TOE) Security Function (TSF) of 
the MYSEA server to the untrusted client and is the key enabler for the MLS LAN 
environment.  The MYSEA server also includes a limited number of network interfaces 
to support a small number of dedicated single-level networks.  Each single-level network 
interfaces with the MYSEA server via a dedicated network interface with a pre-defined 
sensitivity level that corresponds to the sensitivity level of the single-level network.  This 
system requirements document seeks to further extend MYSEA functionality by 
modifying the architecture to support a MLS network interface capable of handling a 
large number of single-level networks at multiple sensitivity levels.  This modification 
will be known as the Connected Single Level Network (CSLN) architecture and is 
depicted in Figure 1. 
One significant modification has occurred to MYSEA since the release of its 
initial system requirements document.  MYSEA upgraded its primary high assurance 
component to the DigitalNet XTS-400 MLS server running the Secure Trusted Operating 
Program (STOP) 6.1 [3].  The XTS-400 continues to enforce a MLS policy based upon 




Figure 1. MYSEA with TCM Integration 
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completing evaluation under the Common Criteria at EAL 5+.  Like the XTS-300, the 
XTS-400 also takes advantage of the Intel x86 chipset four domains of isolation 
architecture to help enforce “the principle of least privilege” at the hardware level [6]. 
Although many features from the XTS-300 were migrated to the XTS-400, one 
major modification was the level of access given to MYSEA programmers to interface 
with the STOP.   Whereas the XTS-300 allowed programmers “to place a trusted daemon 
process in the Operating System Services (OSS) domain of operations,” the XTS-400 no 
longer allows that level of interaction.  Hence, trusted MYSEA daemons now operate in 
the Application Domain as shown in Figure 2. 
To distribute the TSF of the MLS server to each CSLN routed through a MLS 
network interface, a TCM is required.  The TCM is responsible for creating a logically 
isolated and unmistakably distinguishable [1] trusted channel between itself and the 
MYSEA server.  The trusted channel will provide a means to attach an implied sensitivity 
level to all communications between the MYSEA server and the TCM.  The TCM will 
provide the interface for all untrusted CSLN communications addressed to an MLS 
network interface on the MYSEA server.  The TCM, in collaboration with the MYSEA 
server, will provide a verifiable communications channel between the TCM and MYSEA 
server.  The trusted channel will be enabled by the development of a Protected 
Communications Channel (PCC) protocol providing the cornerstone of all trusted 
channel communications.  The trusted channel, in concert with the MYSEA server and 
its TCMs, will provide for the authentication, integrity and confidentiality of all CSLN 
communications. 
2.2 CSLN DESCRIPTION 
The CSLN architecture provides peer-to-peer connectivity between the MYSEA 
server and TCM for existing system high, dedicated or compartmented networks.  The 
CSLN is comprised of the MYSEA server, TCM and an untrusted networking device.  At 
all times, CSLN connectivity will be constrained by the TOE Security Policy (TSP) [2] 
enforced by the MYSEA server.  MYSEA LAN users will maintain the ability to access 
applications on various single-level networks protected by CSLN security components 
operating at the authorized sensitivity level.  Conversely, users on each single-level 
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network will maintain the ability to access applications running on the MYSEA server at 
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Figure 2. STOP System Diagram [7] 
 
2.3 CSLN COMPONENT DESCRIPTIONS   
The MYSEA CSLN is responsible for enabling protected simultaneous access 
between the MYSEA server and a large number of single-level networks.  The MYSEA 
server, TCM and their ability to establish a trusted channel between themselves provides 
a distributed TSF perimeter and enables the MYSEA server to operate an MLS network 
interface.  This architecture relies upon three principle components.  The MYSEA server 
is the key component for this architecture and maintains primary responsibility for 
enforcing all security policies.  The TCM is the second component and serves as a trusted 
endpoint for all trusted channel communications.  An untrusted networking device is the 
third component and is required to multiplex a large number of CSLNs into one MYSEA 
server MLS network interface.  Each single-level network may be considered an external 
component to the CSLN architecture.  They will maintain the capacity to both send and 
receive data from the MYSEA server through the trusted channel via the TCM.  The 





Figure 3. MYSEA CSLN Component Overview 
 
2.3.1 MYSEA Server Target of Evaluation Security Function 
The TSF “is a set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE 
that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP” [2].  Although both the 
TCM and MYSEA server are designed with an individual TSF, this document will 
provide a design to create a distributed TSF for the MYSEA server that includes the 
TCM by establishing an inter-TSF trusted channel between the two security devices. 
To create the security functions necessary to implement a distributed  TSF, the 
MYSEA server requires: a Trusted Channel Server (TCS) to negotiate the  security 
association of each PCC, authorize inbound communications and perform equivalence 
checks on the sensitivity level of all outbound communications; a Secure Connection 
Server (SCS) to ensure processes running on the server and their communications with 
the CSLN are authorized at the correct sensitivity level; a Trusted Channel Database 
(TCDB) to provide correlation between a TCM and the sensitivity level of the CSLN for 
which the TCM provides security services; a Secure Connection Inbound Database 
(SCIDB) to record the data required for the SCS to make its security determinations 
regarding each inbound connection; and a Secure Connection Outbound Database 
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(SCODB) to record the data required for the TCS to make its security determinations 
regarding each outbound connection.  These trusted daemons and databases extend the 
TSF of the MYSEA server to the TCMs supporting each CSLN. 
2.3.1.1  Trusted Channel Server 
 The TCS is a trusted daemon running in the application domain of the 
STOP.  The TCS will perform two primary duties: 1) the TCS will negotiate the security 
association for each trusted channel; and 2) the TCS will authorize each inbound and 
outbound communication.   The TCS will utilize a proprietary MYSEA Security 
Association protocol that is used for initializing, managing and terminating all trusted 
channel communications via the PCC protocol.  The Security Association protocol will 
be similar to the Internet Key Exchange protocol [8], but will streamline the security 
association process to reduce the overall complexity of the protocol.  The Security 
Association protocol will utilize digital certificates and predefined cryptographic 
algorithms to provide a secure means to negotiate the security parameters required to use 
the PCC protocol.  High-level design specifications for the Security Association protocol 
are found in Appendix B of this thesis [9]. 
 The TCS will also authorize each inbound and outbound communication.  
The TCS will work in concert with the PCC protocol handler to receive the implicit 
sensitivity level of each inbound connection so that it may query the TCDB for the 
explicit sensitivity level of each connection.  The TCS will also check the SCODB for the 
explicit sensitivity level of each outbound connection.  The TCS will use this data to 
query the TCDB for the sensitivity level of the requested single-level network and ensure 
that both sensitivity levels are equivalent before authorizing the connection. 
Detailed high level design specifications for the TCS are found in 
Appendix C of this thesis [10].    
2.3.1.2  Secure Connection Server 
  The SCS is a trusted daemon running in the STOP Application Domain.  
This process listens for TCS-authorized inbound CSLN connections.  The SCS is 
responsible for checking the SCIDB for the explicit sensitivity level of each accepted 
connection and spawning the requested application protocol server at the corresponding 
sensitivity level.  Additionally, the SCS will record the explicit sensitivity level of each 
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outbound connection to the SCODB.  This data will be used by the TCS to validate that 
the sensitivity level of the requesting process and the sensitivity level of the requested 
single-level network are equivalent. The correct functionality of the SCS is imperative to 
enforce the TSP of the MYSEA server.  SCS development parallels the “Secure Session 
Server” [1] with minor modifications to the original requirements and will be further 
defined in Appendix C of this thesis [10]. 
2.3.1.3 Trusted Channel Database 
  The TCDB is a static database used to maintain a list of all security 
attributes of all TCMs that are permitted to connect with the MYSEA server.  Each entity 
in the database contain a record consisting of the Internet Protocol Routing Address (IP 
address) of each TCM, a listing of the subnets to which the TCM provides security 
services and its associated explicit sensitivity level.  Only the TCS is permitted “read 
only” access to the TCDB.  Trusted write operations to the TCDB will only be permitted 
by the security administrator in accordance with the ∆ property first noted by Fellows 
[11].  Detailed high level design specifications for the TCDB are found in Appendix C of 
this thesis [10]. 
2.3.1.4  Secure Connection Inbound Database 
  The SCIDB is a dynamic database accessible only to the TCS and SCS.  
The TCS is responsible for creating a record for each new inbound connection and 
posting the explicit sensitivity level of each inbound connection to the newly created 
record.  This record in-turn will be utilized by the SCS to spawn an application protocol 
server at the explicit sensitivity level of the inbound connection.  The database permits 
read and write access for the TCS while permitting “read-only” access for the SCS.  The 
TCS requires write access to the database so that a new record can be created for each 
new connection and so that the record can be deleted upon connection teardown.  The 
TCS requires read access to the database so that a check can be accomplished to 
determine whether a record already exists for a new packet.  The SCS requires read-only 
access to the database to query and return the explicit sensitivity level of each connection.  
The database maintains a record consisting of the original source IP address of the 
connection and the designated sensitivity level of the TCM.  Detailed high level design 
specifications for the SCIDB are found in Appendix C of this thesis [10]. 
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2.3.1.5  Secure Connection Outbound Database 
  The SCODB is a dynamic database accessible only to the SCS and TCS.  
The SCS is responsible for creating a new record in the SCODB consisting of the explicit 
sensitivity level of each outbound connection and the destination information.  This 
database will provide the TCS with a basis for making security decisions on all outbound 
CSLN connections.  The database permits read and write access for the SCS and the 
TCS.  The SCS requires write access to the database so that a new record can be created 
to track each new connection.  The SCS requires read access to the database so that a 
check can be accomplished to determine whether a record already exists for that packet.  
The TCS requires read access to the database so that it can obtain the explicit sensitivity 
level of each connection and requires write access to the database so that the record for 
each connection can be deleted upon connection teardown.  The database maintains a 
record consisting of the destination IP address and the sensitivity level of the originating 
process.  Detailed high level design specifications for the SCODB are found in Appendix 
C of this thesis [10]. 
2.3.1.6  Protected Communications Channel Protocol Handler 
 The PCC protocol is instrumental for establishing each trusted channel.  
The PCC concept was first introduced by Wilson [1] as a mechanism to establish a 
trusted path between the TPE and MYSEA server.  The CSLN modifies and leverages 
the original PCC protocol to support a peer-to-peer trusted channel connection between 
the MYSEA server and the TCM.  The PCC provides data segregation for all network 
traffic entering and exiting the MLS network interface.  The PCC protocol handler 
provides trusted channel security and data segregation by providing the following 
security services: identification and authentication, integrity, and confidentiality.  
Although these security services provide the necessary mechanisms to 
enable a trusted channel, they are not without residual risk.  Basic traffic analysis within 
the CSLN will still be possible.  Additionally, covert channels may possibly be created 
from the classified CSLNs.  Future work on the MYSEA architecture should analyze 
these vulnerabilities and design changes to mitigate their risk.  Appendix B of this thesis 
[9] provides detailed developmental analysis for the PCC protocol.    
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2.3.2 Trusted Channel Module Target of Evaluation Security Function 
Services 
The TCM is a dedicated device placed on the network between each single-level 
network and the MYSEA server. The TCM will be engineered in accordance with 
Common Criteria security functions required for initiating trusted channel 
communications.  The target Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level for the TCM 
will be EAL 6.  To facilitate this goal, the TCM will leverage the Center for Information 
Systems Security Studies and Research (CISR) Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) 
Project [12] to provide a high assurance security kernel as its underlying operating 
system.   The TCX kernel is intended to be evaluated at the EAL 7.  The TCM must 
provide an unforgeable link between the MYSEA server and the CSLN.  The TCM 
functionally serves as a high assurance endpoint virtual private network (VPN) device.  
The TCM will also serve as the front-end interface responsible for translating the IP 
addresses from its single level network domains to the MLS domain.  The Department of 
Defense has allocated separate IP spaces for each of its unclassified and classified 
domains out of the worldwide IP address block.  By policy, IP addresses in a higher 
classified domain can not be advertised and resolved in a lower classified domain [13].  
To overcome IP address and resolution challenges for the MYSEA server, the TCM will 
serve as a network address translator for its CSLN.  Information flows between the 
MYSEA server and the TCM have an implicit sensitivity level, which the MYSEA server 
utilizes to explicitly enforce its mandatory security policy.  The TCM requires the 
development of two trusted daemons in order for it to provide a trusted endpoint with 
which the MYSEA server that can establish a trusted channel:  The TCS and the Network 
Address Translation (NAT) [14] Server. 
2.3.2.1  Trusted Channel Server 
 The TCS running on the TCM will mirror the functionality provided by 
the TCS running on the MYSEA server for initiating and managing the MYSEA Security 
Association protocol.  The correct operation of the Security Association protocol is 




2.3.2.2  Network Address Translation Server 
 The NAT server will mediate all connectivity between the IP address 
space of the single-level network and the MYSEA IP address space.  Rationale for 
providing NAT functionality for the CSLN can be found in the Chapter II of this thesis 
[15].  The NAT server will provide dynamic destination NAT on all inbound packets and 
static source NAT on all outbound packets.   
2.3.2.3  Protected Communications Channel Protocol Handler 
 The PCC protocol handler will be embedded into the IP stack of the TCM 
and will be responsible for making all access control decisions from the single-level 
network to the MYSEA server and from the MYSEA server to the single-level network 
based upon its security policy database.   The TCM implementation of the PCC protocol 
will be IPsec conformant.   
2.3.3 Single Level Networks 
 Each single-level network represents a significant investment of resources (e.g. 
SIPRNET, JWICS and other compartmented or coalition partner networks) that will 
continue operations for the foreseeable future.  MYSEA servers through their CSLN 
architecture will serve as a bridge between the various single-level networks until a 
comprehensive MLS architecture is fielded.  Until then, single-level networks will 
continue to provide the backbone for MYSEA network connectivity, data and single 




3. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
3.1 CONNECTED SINGLE LEVEL NETWORK REQUIREMENTS 
3.1.1 MYSEA shall be capable of supporting a large number of simultaneous 
single level network connections to and from multiple MYSEA servers. 
3.1.2 MYSEA shall support these connections at multiple sensitivity levels with 
high assurance. 
3.1.3 MYSEA shall provide identification and authentication, integrity and 
confidentiality to shared resources and application protocol services at designated 
sensitivity levels to each CSLN. 
3.2 MYSEA SERVER REQUIREMENTS 
The following MYSEA server requirements are necessary to manage 
simultaneous single level connections between itself and a TCM to establish a trusted 
channel.  An abstract overview of a CSLN connection is presented in Figure 4. 
3.2.1 The MYSEA server shall be able to establish multiple simultaneous 
trusted channel communications with pre-determined TCMs upon demand through a 
single MLS network interface. 
3.2.2 The MYSEA server shall be able to support multiple MLS network 
interfaces. 
3.2.3 Once a trusted channel is established with the TCM, any breakdown of the 
trusted channel detected by the MYSEA server shall lead to the termination of the 
connection independent of any other active trusted channel connections. 
3.2.4 The MYSEA server shall associate a sensitivity level to a trusted channel 
based on the security attributes found in the PCC and further defined in a pre-configured 
trusted database. 
3.2.5 The MYSEA server shall protect against disclosure and modification of 
information transiting the CSLN trusted channels. 
3.2.6 The MYSEA server shall regulate all TCM access to itself. 
3.2.7 The MYSEA server shall be responsible for trusted channel teardown 
upon the completion of each connection. 
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3.2.8 The MYSEA server shall implement network security mechanisms that 
protect against disclosure and modification of information transiting the trusted channel. 
3.3 TRUSTED CHANNEL MODULE REQUIREMENTS 
3.3.1 The TCM shall be able to establish multiple simultaneous trusted 
channels, all at the same sensitivity level, with multiple MYSEA servers. 
3.3.2 Once a trusted channel is established, any breakdown of the trusted 
channel detected by the TCM shall lead to the termination of the connection.  
3.3.3 The TCM shall have no runtime user interface. 
3.3.4 The TCM shall implement network security mechanisms that protect 
against disclosure and modification of information transiting the trusted channel. 
3.3.5 The TCM shall implement Network Address Translation services for all 
communications transiting the CSLN. 
 
 
Figure 4. CSLN Connection Overview 
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3.4 MYSEA CONNECTION PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS 
3.4.1 MYSEA shall provide a communications protocol that facilitates a 
logically distinct trusted channel for the identification and authentication, integrity, and 
confidentiality of all authenticated communications between the MYSEA server and its 
authorized TCMs.  Detailed requirements for the PCC protocol are found in Appendix B 
of this thesis [9]. 
3.5 CONNECTED SINGLE LEVEL NETWORK APPLICATION PROTOCOL 
SERVICES REQUIREMENTS 
The CSLN network application protocol services requirements are enumerated 
below. 
3.5.1 The CSLN shall have the capability to support all ISO Layer 3 and above 
application protocols. 
3.5.2 The MYSEA server application protocol servers shall provide the 
capability to support commercial off the shelf and government off the shelf application 
products for authenticated users. 
3.5.3 Access to resources and services on the MYSEA server from single level 
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX A ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND DEFINITIONS 
A.1 Abbreviations, Acronyms 
 
CISR   Center for Information Systems Security 
Studies and Research 
CSLN   MYSEA Connected Single Level Network(s) 
IP   Internet Protocol 
JWICS  Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 
LAN   Local Area Network 
MLS  Multilevel Security 
MYSEA  Monterey Security Architecture 
NIPRNET NonSecure Internet Protocol Router Network 
PCC   Protected Communications Channel 
SCIDB Secure Connection Inbound Database 
SCODB Secure Connection Outbound Database 
SCS  Secure Connection Server 
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network 
STOP  Secure Trusted Operating Program 
TCM   Trusted Channel Module 
TCS   Trusted Channel Server 
TCDB   Trusted Channel Server Database  
TCX   Trusted Computing Exemplar 
TOE   Target of Evaluation 
TPE   Trusted Path Extension Device 
TSF   Target of Evaluation Security Function 







2.1 Connected Single Level Network (CSLN):  The segment of the MYSEA 
architecture from the MYSEA server to its supported TCMs responsible for providing 
single level network connectivity to the MYSEA server. 
2.2 Inter-TSF Transfers: Communicating data between the TOE and the 
security functions of other trusted IT products [2]. 
2.3 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel: Requires that the TSF provide a trusted 
communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product [2]. 
2.4 Principle of Least Privilege: Every program and every user of the system 
should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job [6]. 
2.5 Sensitivity Level:  The combined classification of data based upon its 
security or classification level and integrity level. 
2.6 Target of Evaluation (TOE):  An IT product or system and its associated 
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation [2]. 
2.7 TOE Security Functions (TSF):  A set consisting of all hardware, software, 
and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP 
[2]. 
2.8 TOE Security Functions Interface (TSFI):  A set of interfaces, whether 
interactive (man-machine interface) or programmatic (application programming 
interface), through which TOE resources are accessed, mediated by the TSF, or 
information is obtained from the TSF [2]. 
2.9 TOE Security Policy (TSP):  A set of rules that regulate how assets are 
managed, protected and distributed within a TOE [2]. 
2.10 Trusted Channel:  A means by which a TSF and a remote trusted IT 
product can communicate with necessary confidence to support the TSP [2]. 
2.11 Trusted Channel Module:  Security device required to enable “Inter-TSF 
Trusted Channels” between the MYSEA server and its authorized single level network. 
2.12 Trusted Path:  A means by which a user and a TSF can communicate with 
necessary confidence to support the TSP [2]. 
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 The purpose of this systems requirements document is to provide a high level 
analysis of the incorporation of IPsec into the Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) 
Protected Communications Channel (PCC) Protocol and describe the IPsec functionality 
necessary to enable a trusted channel.  Requirements for the PCC were initially identified 
in “A Trusted Connection Framework for Multilevel Secure Local Area Networks” [1].  
Common Criteria standards and terminology shall be used to describe all hardware, 
software, firmware, and their interactions [2]. 
1.2 SCOPE 
 This document defines the MYSEA PCC protocol functionality required to 
establish a trusted channel between the MYSEA server and a new security device 
hereafter known as the Trusted Channel Module (TCM).  The PCC protocol also applies 
to a trusted path between the MYSEA server and the Trusted Path Extension (TPE) 
device.  The integration of a trusted channel into MYSEA is crucial in order for the 
MYSEA server to provide protected, simultaneous connections to a large number of 
single level networks (e.g., NIPRNET, SIPRNET, JWICS) through a single multilevel 
secure (MLS) network interface.  These connections will operate at multiple sensitivity 
levels while providing simultaneous management of all connections.  Satisfying these 
requirements provides MYSEA with a required component necessary to provide a robust 
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2. PROTECTED COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL OVERVIEW 
2.1 MYSEA CONNECTIVITY 
 Producing a distributed (MLS environment featuring commercial-off-the-shelf 
form and features is the objective of MYSEA.  This architecture features two distinct 
segments that enable MLS connectivity to the end user.  The MYSEA Local Area 
Network (LAN) connects the end user to the MYSEA MLS server and is capable of 
delivering multiple sensitivity levels of data and applications to the authorized end user.  
The Connected Single Level Network (CSLN) affords the MYSEA server a mechanism 
for protected connectivity to multiple simultaneous single level networks by providing a 
distributed Trusted Security Function (TSF) to the TCM.  Currently, the MYSEA server 
has a limited number of network interfaces to connect this large number of single level 
networks.  The Department of Defense and private industry support a very large number 
of system high, dedicated and compartment single level networks, each operating with 
multiple compartments, caveats, and releasibility issues.  Therefore, evolving the 
functionality to include a MLS network interface into the MYSEA server becomes an 
essential feature for providing a truly distributed MLS environment.   Figure 1 presents 
an overview of CSLN communications. 
2.2 CSLN TRANSMISSION SECURITY 
Transmission security (TRANSEC) of all trusted channel communications 
between the MYSEA server and the TCM is the critical factor required to establish a 
distributed MLS architecture.  An unforgeable link between these two critical-security 
components protecting the integrity and confidentiality of all communications while 
providing absolute identification and authentication is an unconditional requirement for 
establishing this trusted channel.  
2.3  TRUSTED CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS 
Establishing a trusted channel is the key enabling operation for CSLN 
communications.  The trusted channel enables the MYSEA server to ensure only 
authorized communications are permitted into the MYSEA server from the TCMs and 




Figure 1. MYSEA Connected Single Level Network Overview 
 
network.  A trusted channel is defined  in Section 13 of The Common Criteria [3] as “a 
trusted communications channel between the TSF and other trusted IT products. ”  It 
further states that “a trusted channel is a communication channel that may be initiated by 
either side of the channel, and provides non-repudiation characteristics with respect to the 
identity of the sides of the channel.”  FTP_ITC Inter-TSF Trusted Channels is the 
governing Common Criteria subsection mandating required trusted channel behaviors.  
The following behaviors are defined for MYSEA CSLNs: 
2.3.1 FTP_ITC.1.1 - The TSF shall provide a communication channel between 
itself and a remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication 
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the 
channel data from modification or disclosure. 
2.3.2 FTP_ITC.1.2 - The TSF shall permit both the TSF and the remote trusted 
IT product (i.e., TCM) to initiate communication via the trusted channel. 
2.3.3 1 FTP_ITC.1.3 - The TSF shall use a trusted channel for all 
communications between the MYSEA server and TCM. 
                     
1 FTP_ITC 1.3 Security Functional Requirement modified to include Common Criteria Observation 
Decisions Review Board Precedent Database revision to eliminate contradiction between FTP ITC 1.2 and 
FTP ITC 1.3. 
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2.4 PROTECTED COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL PROTOCOL 
The CSLN encompasses all trusted channel initialization and trusted channel 
communications between the MYSEA server and its authorized TCMs.  The CSLN will 
utilize a cryptographic communications protocol to establish high assurance, logically 
distinct communications channels providing authentication, integrity and confidentiality.  
The CSLN will build upon earlier PCC protocol analysis [1] and further define its 
required attributes to invoke a trusted channel.  The PCC will be integrated into the IP 
stack of the host operating system.  A trusted daemon hereafter known as the Trusted 
Channel Server (TCS) will be responsible for initiating, managing, and terminating each 
PCC connection.  The TCS will operate on both the MYSEA server and the TCM. 
The PCC packet carries with it an implied sensitivity level for its CSLN.  The 
PCC protocol handler will implement a custom API to extract the source IP addresses 
from the inner and outer IPsec headers and pass that data to the TCS for further security-
related actions.  The TCS must acknowledge that the transfer was successful before the 
PCC process can continue.  The TCS works in conjunction with the Secure Connection 
Server (SCS) and three protected databases known as the Trusted Channel Database 
(TCDB), the Secure Connection Outbound Database (SCODB) and the Secure 
Connection Inbound Database (SCIDB) to multiplex a very large number of CSLNs into 
one MYSEA server MLS network interface.   High level design requirements for these 
daemons and databases are found in Appendix A.  Detailed implementation design for 
these daemons and databases are found in Appendix C. 
Although the PCC will be encrypted, initial iterations of the protocol will not 
meet Type I requirements as mandated by the Department of Defense [4].  Therefore, 
National Security Agency Type I certified encryption equipment shall be used to cover 
any classified communications between the TCM and MYSEA server where the TCM is 
not physically co-located with the MYSEA server in a protected environment. 
2.4.1 IPsec Protocol – MYSEA selected IPsec as its PCC protocol after 
analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the various candidate protocols [1].  IPsec 
supports multiple transport protocols, cryptographic algorithms and key management 
schemes, which yields the necessary flexibility to ensure the PCC delivers a full range of 
security services to MYSEA.  In accordance with Common Criteria requirements 
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specified for implementing inter-TSF trusted channels, IPsec supports initiation of the 
trusted channel by either side of the channel, identification and authentication, integrity, 
and confidentiality for each transmitted packet.  Additionally, IPsec provides non-
repudiation, logically distinct data separation and anti-replay protection.  IPsec enables 
implementation of access control lists (ACL), which provides the fine grain control 
necessary to authorize all inbound and outbound communications with router-equivalent 
specificity.   Requirements for the MYSEA IPsec implementation are detailed in Section 
3.2 of this appendix and are founded upon Draft IETF IPsec RFC2401bis-01, “Security 
Architecture for the Internet Protocol” [5]. 
2.4.2 Residual Risk – The security services provided by IPsec afford the CSLN 
architecture the mechanism needed to establish a trusted channel between the MYSEA 
server and TCM.  However, some residual risk remains.  First, IPsec is limited to using 
Type II cryptographic algorithms, which are not certified for use with classified data.  
Second, IPsec security mechanisms cannot stop basic traffic analysis techniques.  Even 
so, the DoD has already accepted this risk through the use of its current generation of 
Type I IP encryptors.  Third, the possibility exists for covert channels to be created in the 
CSLN.  Future work for MYSEA should include a residual risk study of the CSLN and 
design changes to mitigate those risks. 
2.5  MYSEA SERVER APPLICATION PROTOCOL SERVICES 
Once the TCM and MYSEA server are connected via the trusted channel, 
authorization to access application-level protocol services (e.g., IMAP, FTP, HTTP, etc.) 
may be granted to the single-level network based upon the sensitivity level of the 
connection.  The TCS shall be responsible for querying the TCDB and performing this 
security-critical operation.  Upon authentication, the TCS shall post the sensitivity level of 
each connection to the SCIDB.  The SCS shall query the SCIDB for the sensitivity level 
of the connections and spawn the requested application protocol server [6] at the correct 
sensitivity level as determined by the TCS.  Note that a connection from a single-level 
network to the MYSEA server is only authenticated to the network level, not the 
individual user.  Future work for the MYSEA architecture should include mechanisms 
for authenticating individual single-level network users to the MYSEA server.  
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Application service validation mechanisms will be covered in detail in Appendix C of 
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3. CONNECTION PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS 
3.1  PROTECTED COMMUNICATIONS PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS 
3.1.1 Both the MYSEA server and the TCM shall have the capability to initiate 
the establishment of the trusted channel. 
3.1.2 The trusted channel shall provide secure communications to include 
authentication, integrity and confidentiality between the MYSEA server and the TCM. 
3.1.3 The trusted channel shall implement anti-replay control features. 
3.1.4 The trusted channel shall utilize the IPsec protocol as the underlying 
mechanism to implement the PCC protocol. 
3.1.5 The TCS shall initiate and manage all PCC connections. 
3.1.6 Explicit end of connection tear-down commands shall be sent only by the 
MYSEA server. 
3.1.7 Upon recognition of a connection failure by either the MYSEA server or 
the TCM, the recognizing component shall tear-down the connection – fail secure [8]. 
3.1.7.1 Only authenticated communications shall transit the CSLN between 
the MYSEA server and its associated TCMs. 
3.2  IPSEC PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS 
3.2.1 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol - ESP shall be invoked to 
provide packet authentication and confidentiality.  Although projected implementations 
of the CSLN will connect the MYSEA server to a TCM co-located in a secure 
environment, ESP remains a requirement due to the mandatory inclusion of an untrusted 
networking device between the MYSEA server and its TCM.  This device is responsible 
for multiplexing a large number of TCM connections into one MYSEA server network 
interface.  To prevent the possible exploitation of MLS data transiting this low assurance, 
untrusted device, ESP encryption will be used to enforce data separation and 
confidentiality of all trusted communications while in transit between the MYSEA server 
and TCM.   ESP protects against IP spoofing, packet modification and unauthorized 
disclosure between the MLS server and the CSLN client. 
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3.2.2 Authentication Header (AH) protocol - AH shall be invoked to provide 
packet authentication and integrity to include the immutable IP header fields of the outer 
header and anti-replay protection.  Although many of the security functions between ESP 
and AH appear the same, the ability of AH to provide data integrity on the outer header is 
a crucial design feature necessary to invoke a trusted channel.  This requirement will be 
discussed in detail in Appendix C.   AH protects against IP spoofing, packet 
modification, and replay attacks between the MLS server and the TCM. 
3.2.3 IPsec Physical Implementation - Integrating IPsec may occur at three 
layers to include [5]: 
3.2.3.1 Integration in the native IP stack.  Native integration permits 
IPsec to be embedded directly into the IP layer source code.  This method of integration 
provides for more efficient processing than the other two methods of IPsec integration, 
both of which will be discussed in the next section.  However, Native integration may be 
the most difficult for the MYSEA project to implement, as it requires access to the source 
code of the operating system.   
3.2.3.2 Integration as a "bump-in-the-stack" (BITS). 
IPsec is implemented "underneath" an existing implementation of 
an IP protocol stack, between the native IP and the local network drivers.  Source 
code access for the IP stack is not required in this context, making this 
implementation approach appropriate for use with legacy systems.  This 
approach, when it is adopted, is usually employed in hosts. 
3.2.3.3 Integration as a “bump-in-the-wire (BITW).  
The use of a dedicated, inline security protocol processor is a 
common design feature of systems used by the military, and of some commercial 
systems as well.  It is sometimes referred to as a "bump-in-the-wire" (BITW) 
implementation.  Such implementations may be designed to serve either a host or 
a gateway.  Usually the BITW device is itself IP addressable.  When supporting a 
single host, it may be quite analogous to a BITS implementation, but in 
supporting a router or firewall, it must operate like a security gateway. 
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 Due to the gateway functionality of the TCM, the TCM shall implement a 
BITW IPsec configuration in accordance with the RFC definition.  Integrating IPsec into 
the MYSEA server is more complicated.  If possible, a native integration into the 
MYSEA server shall be used, which yields the best possible results.  If integration at the 
native layer is not possible, a BITS IPsec implementation shall be used in the MYSEA 
server. 
3.2.4 Security Association and Key Management - IPsec includes the capability 
to perform manual or automated security association (SA) and cryptographic key 
management.  Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKE2) [9] is the preferred IPsec 
automated SA and cryptographic key management protocol.  However, MYSEA shall 
implement a custom automated SA protocol that may inherit features from IKE2, but will 
be substantially reduced in complexity.  This new protocol will streamline the connection 
negotiation process and minimize the complexity necessary to evaluate the correctness of 
the automated SA protocol for a high assurance evaluation. The MYSEA automated SA 
and key management architecture shall implement the following requirements. 
3.2.4.1 Digital Certificates.  MYSEA shall use digital certificates to 
assign a public/private key pair to the MYSEA server and its associated TCMs. All 
initialization messages shall be signed with the private key owned by the sender and 
encrypted with the public key owned by the receiver.  Upon receipt of each message, the 
receiver shall validate that the request is from an authorized sender using the public key 
owned by the sender and decrypt the data using the private key owned by the receiver. 
3.2.4.2 Key Negotiation and Management.  The MYSEA server shall be 
solely responsible for generating a unique symmetric connection key for each trusted 
channel.  Each connection key shall be sent to the TCM and used for communications 
specific to the negotiated connection. 
3.2.4.3 IPsec Algorithms.  IPsec includes several cryptographic 
algorithms to enforce its authentication, confidentiality and integrity mechanisms.  
MYSEA shall use two predetermined algorithms to eliminate the complexity necessary to 
negotiate the cryptographic algorithms of each connection.  MYSEA shall use the AES-
128-CBC [10] algorithm to enforce confidentiality and the HMAC-SHA1 [11] algorithm 
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to enforce integrity.  Should these algorithms be found to have vulnerabilities, alternative 
algorithms may be substituted in their place. 
3.2.4.4 Security Parameter Index (SPI).  The MYSEA server and TCM 
shall each create a unique SPI upon initial connection negotiation so that anti-replay 
protection features are enabled. 
 A simplified overview of the TCM-to-MYSEA server automated SA 
process is illustrated in Figure 2.  The TCM shall send a connection request to the 
MYSEA server.  The MYSEA server shall then create an initial security parameter index 
(SPI) and symmetric connection key unique to the connection and send the data to the 
requesting TCM.  The TCM shall acknowledge the connection negotiation data from the 
server, reply with its own SPI and establish a SA based upon the symmetric key created 
by the server.  The server will acknowledge the SPI from the TCM, create a SA for the 
connection and declare that it is ready to receive.  The TCM will commence data 
transmission with the negotiated symmetric connection key.  
 A simplified overview of the MYSEA server-to-TCM automated SA 
process is illustrated in Figure 3.  The MYSEA server shall create an initial security 
parameter index and symmetric connection key unique to the connection and send the 
data to the requested TCM.  The TCM shall acknowledge the connection negotiation data 
from the server, create and reply with its own SPI and establish a SA based upon the 
symmetric key created by the server.  The server will acknowledge the SPI from the 
TCM and create a SA for the connection.  The MYSEA server will commence data 
transmission with the negotiated symmetric connection key.  
 Specific design and development details regarding the MYSEA automated 
SA protocol is left for future work.   
3.2.5 Management of Covert Channels - IPsec tunnel mode recognizes that 
mutable differentiated services code point fields (DSCP) may be used to provide covert 
communications.  MYSEA shall map the DSCP field to a fixed value to negate this 
potential vulnerability. 
3.2.6 MYSEA integration of the IPsec Protocol - Per Appendix A, the MYSEA 
TCS shall associate an explicit sensitivity level to all incoming trusted channel 
communications based upon the IP address of the authenticated TCM.  Using IPsec 
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tunnel mode, the TCM IP address is contained in the outer IP header which is stripped 
away during initial IPsec inbound processing.  This leaves only the original source IP 
address for processing at the network and transport layers.  Therefore, the PCC protocol 
handler shall provide a custom API to extract and return the inner and outer source IP 
addresses located in the IPsec header and send that data to the TCS for further security 
decisions. 
3.2.7 Future work - Initial iterations of the TCM shall provide no remote user 
interface.  Future iterations may include an IPsec transport mode implementation to 
facilitate a Simple Network Management Protocol [12] equivalent for remote TCM 
















APPENDIX A ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND DEFINITIONS 
A.1 Abbreviations, Acronyms 
 
ACL   Access Control List 
AH  Authentication Header Protocol 
BITS   Bump-in-the-Stack 
BITW   Bump-in-the-Wire 
CSLN   Connected Single Level Network 
ESP   Encapsulating Security Payload Protocol 
IKE2   Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 
IP   Internet Protocol 
JWICS  Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications 
    System 
LAN  Local Area Network 
MLS   Multilevel Security 
MYSEA  Monterey Security Architecture 
NIPRNET NonSecure Internet Protocol Router Network 
PCC   Protected Communications Channel 
RFC  Request for Comment 
SA   Security Association 
SCS  Secure Connection Server 
SCIDB Secure Connection Inbound Database 
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network 
SCODB Secure Connection Outbound Database 
SPI  Security Parameter Index 
TCM   Trusted Channel Module 
TCS   Trusted Channel Server 
TCDB   Trusted Channel Database  
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TRANSEC  Transmission Security 




2.1 Connected Single Level Network (CSLN):  The segment of the MYSEA 
architecture from the MYSEA server to its supported TCMs responsible for providing 
single level network connectivity to the MYSEA server. 
2.2 Fail-secure:  Fail secure asserts that no compromise occurs even when some 
components are unavailable [8]. 
2.3 Sensitivity Level:  The combined classification of data based upon its 
security or classification level and integrity level. 
2.4 Trusted Channel:  A means by which a TSF and a remote trusted IT product 
can communicate with necessary confidence to support the Target of Evaluation Security 
Policy [3] 
2.5 Trusted Channel Module (TCM):  Security device required to enable “Inter-
TSF Trusted Channels” with the MYSEA server. 
2.6 Target of Evaluation (TOE):  An IT product or system and its associated 
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation [2]. 
2.7 TOE Security Functions (TSF):  A set consisting of all hardware, software, 
and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP 
[2]. 
2.8 Transmission Security (TRANSEC): The component of Communication 
Security (COMSEC) that results from the application of measures designed to protect 
transmissions from interception and exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis [4]. 
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Providing a specific framework for enabling the Connected Single Level Network 
(CSLN) segment of the Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) is the purpose of this 
document.  This framework extends the initial requirements for MYSEA first identified 
in Appendix C of “A Trusted Connection Framework for Multilevel Secure Local Area 
Networks” [1] and later expanded upon in an “Overview of High Assurance Architecture 
for Distributed Multilevel Security” [2].  Common Criteria standards and terminology 
shall be used to describe all hardware, software, firmware and their interactions [3]. 
1.2 SCOPE 
MYSEA provides a framework for supporting multilevel security (MLS) to end 
user clients with commercial-off-the-shelf functionality.  The MYSEA CSLN segment 
encompasses all communications between two high assurance devices.  The first device 
is the MYSEA server which uses the DigitalNet XTS-400 Trusted Computing System 
running the Secure Trusted Operating Program (STOP) [4].  The second device is the 
Trusted Channel Module (TCM) under development at the Center for Information 
Systems Security Studies and Research (CISR) at the Naval Postgraduate School.  These 
two high assurance devices provide the underlying security functionality required to 
create a trusted channel, which enables the MYSEA server to multiplex a large number 
of existing system high, compartmented and dedicated networks (e.g., NIPRNET, 
SIPRNET, JWICS) into a single MLS network interface.  This document will provide 
detailed explanations concerning the trusted channel protocols, management functions 
and state transitions between the Trusted Channel Module (TCM) and the MYSEA server 
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2. TRUSTED CHANNEL MANAGEMENT 
2.1 OVERVIEW 
The CSLN segment depends upon several modifications to the existing MYSEA 
architecture.  Most notably, a trusted channel between the MYSEA server and TCM must 
be created to affect the required functionality necessary to enable MLS network 
interfaces.  MYSEA designers designated the protocol required to implement a trusted 
channel the Protected Communications Channel (PCC) protocol.  Additionally, the 
MYSEA server requires the creation of two trusted daemons, the Trusted Channel Server 
(TCS) and the Secure Connection Server (SCS).  These daemons extrapolate an implied 
sensitivity level associated with a PCC connection and enforce an explicit sensitivity level 
on all trusted channel connections processed by the MYSEA server.  The TCS is 
responsible for setting-up and terminating PCC connections as well as associating a 
sensitivity level with all inbound and outbound PCC connections.  For incoming 
connections, the SCS is responsible for spawning application protocol servers at the 
correct sensitivity level.  For outgoing connections, the SCS is responsible for generating 
the required information necessary for the TCS to enforce the overall security policy of 
the server. 
The creation of three protected databases is also required in the MYSEA server: 
1) the Trusted Channel Database (TCDB); 2) the Secure Connection Inbound Database 
(SCIDB); and 3) the Secure Connection Outbound Database (SCODB).  These three 
databases work in concert with the TCS and SCS to track the sensitivity level of all 
trusted channel communications.  The TCDB is a protected static database which 
associates an explicit sensitivity level between a TCM and its CSLN IP address.  The 
SCIDB is a protected database used to record the explicit sensitivity level of each inbound 
connection from the trusted channel.  The records in the SCIDB are used to ensure that, 
for each trusted channel, the sensitivity level of the server process to which the packet is 
destined is equal to that of the connection.  The SCODB is a protected database used to 
verify that each MYSEA server application requesting connections with a CSLN has an 
equivalent sensitivity level.  The records in the SCODB are used by the TCS to enforce 
this sensitivity level check. 
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The TCM requires the implementation of two trusted daemons to manage the 
trusted channel: The first is the TCM TCS; and the second is the TCM Network Address 
Translation (NAT) server.  The TCM TCS will work in step with the MYSEA server to 
set-up and terminate each PCC connection.  The NAT server will provide destination 
NAT on all CSLN inbound connections and source NAT on all outbound CSLN 
connections.  The rationale for imposing NAT functionality in the TCM stems from the 
current DoD IP address security policy.  The DoD owns a significant block of the global 
IP address spaces.  Current Department of Defense policy stipulates the segmentation of 
this IP space between its various unclassified and classified domains to ensure that no 
overlap of the global IP address space exists.  The Network Information Center at the 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is the primary entity responsible for 
allocating the DoD IP space.  The DISA “SIPRNET Classification Guide“ [5] stipulates 
that classified domain IP addresses remain physically and cryptographically separated 
from the unclassified IP domain and, by policy, a classified IP address can not be 
associated with a place or system, or advertised in a domain of lower classification.  As a 
result, MYSEA servers acting in their MLS capacity will be required to operate in a 
separate IP space until a DoD MLS IP policy can be formulated.   
2.2 PROTECTED COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL PROTOCOL 
Per research presented in “A Trusted Connection Framework for Multilevel 
Secure Local Area Networks” [1], the PCC shall be based on the IPsec protocol.  High 
level design and implementation details are specified in Appendix B of this thesis [6].  
The PCC shall provide authentication, confidentiality and integrity for all CSLN data 
transiting between the MYSEA server and the TCM.  These security services will be 
enabled by evoking the IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol and the IP 
Authentication Header (AH) protocol in Tunnel Mode. 
The ESP protocol will be used to protect the confidentiality of all CSLN 
connections and ensure data segregation between the MYSEA server and its associated 
TCMs.  The AH protocol will be used to protect the authenticity and integrity of all 
CSLN connections.  Although ESP has an integrity protection mechanism, that 
mechanism does not protect the outer IPsec header created when using tunnel mode.  As 
such, ESP integrity protection is not used by the PCC protocol.  Hence, AH is required to 
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provide integrity across the IPsec packet to include the immutable fields of the new outer 
IP header.  Tunnel Mode is an IPsec mode of operation used to protect packets traversing 
a security gateway device like the TCM.  Tunnel mode encapsulates the original IP 
packet in a new IPsec packet and incorporates a new IP header and several additional 
fields necessary to complete each IPsec transaction.  ESP and AH each have unique fields 
that are applied as each protocol is invoked.  These protocols can be applied sequentially 
on the same packet, known as a security bundle, to layer both ESP and AH security 
services on the packet which they are acting upon. 
Although the IPsec protocol provides authentication, confidentiality and integrity, 
some residual risk remains.  IPsec cannot mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with 
basic traffic analysis and covert channels.  Future work on MYSEA should include a 
thorough risk assessment of the CSLN architecture with respect to these vulnerabilities. 
2.3 MYSEA SERVER 
In this section, the MYSEA server trusted channel management functions 
necessary to create an MLS network interface are presented. 
2.3.1 Trusted Channel Server 
The TCS will be a trusted multi-function daemon instrumental to the enforcement 
of the Target of Evaluation Security Policy (TSP) of the MYSEA server.  The TCS will 
be designed to provide two critical security services: 1) the TCS will manage a 
proprietary MYSEA Security Association protocol which is essential to the secure setup 
of the PCC (IPsec) connection; and 2) the TCS will be responsible for enforcing the TSP 
of the MYSEA server by authorizing each inbound and outbound connection based upon 
its explicit sensitivity level.   
The TCS will set-up and terminate all PCC connections.  Upon recognition of a 
new PCC connection request, the PCC protocol handler will call the TCS to set-up the 
connection by applying the MYSEA Security Association protocol.  The high level 
design of this protocol is found in Appendix B of this thesis [6]. 
The TCS will also permit the creation of an MLS network interface by enabling 
the MYSEA server to enforce all CSLN security decisions outside of the trusted domain 
of the XTS-400 STOP.  The TCS will enforce these decisions differently based upon 
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whether the communication it receives is inbound to the MYSEA server or outbound to 
the TCM. 
2.3.1.1     TCS Inbound Processing 
For inbound connections, the PCC protocol handler will extract key data 
fields from the deconstruction of each IPsec packet and send that data to the TCS.  These 
fields consist of the source IP addresses from the inner and outer IPsec packet header.  
The source IP address of the outer header is that of the TCM, which through the trusted 
channel, conveys the packets implicit sensitivity level.  The TCS will use the IP address 
of the TCM to query the TCDB and use the returned data to associate an explicit 
sensitivity level to the incoming connection.  The TCS will create a new record in the 
SCIDB and store the explicit sensitivity level of each connection and source IP address 
from the inner header for later use by the SCS.  Once the values have been stored in the 
SCIDB, the TCS shall signal the PCC protocol handler to continue processing the 
incoming packet. 
An example of an AH/ESP security bundled packet displaying its primary 
fields is depicted in Figure 1.  The new IP header field is created by the tunnel mode of 
IPsec and contains the IP address of the tunnel endpoints.  For MYSEA, the endpoints are 
the MYSEA server and its associated TCM.  The AH field is specific to the AH protocol 
and defines the security parameters necessary for each end of the tunnel to process the 
packet.  Likewise, the ESP field defines the security parameters necessary for each end of 
the tunnel to process the ESP portion of the packet.  The original IP header field contains 
the source and destination IP address from the original IP packet.  The next field denotes 
the layer four protocol of the original packet – TCP for this example.  The data field is 
the data from the original packet.  
 
AH/ESP Protected Packet 
AH ESP  Data TCPOriginal IP HeaderNew IP Header
ESP Encryption
AH Authentication  
 
Figure 1. IPsec AH/ESP Packet 
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2.3.1.1.1 Initial TCS processing 
The PCC protocol handler will first process the AH and ESP 
protected packet and verify that the packet meets the requirements of the SPD and that 
the packet correctly decrypts using the prescribed cryptographic algorithms.  Upon 
successful completion of the cryptographic checks, the PCC protocol handler will pass 
the new and original source IP addresses to the TCS.  The TCS will use the source IP 
address (the IP address of the TCM) from the outer header to query the TCDB and derive 
the explicit sensitivity level of the packet.   
2.3.1.1.2 Final TCS Processing 
The TCS will create a new record in the SCIDB and write both the 
original source IP address and the explicit sensitivity level to that record for use by the 
SCS.  The TCS will then signal the PCC protocol handler to continue processing the 
packet.  The PCC protocol handler will forward the original IP packet up the networking 
stack for further processing and eventual action by the SCS.  The original IP packet is 




Figure 2. Original IP Packet 
 
2.3.1.2  TCS Outbound Processing 
For outbound connection requests, the SCS requests the TCS to verify that 
the sensitivity level of the outbound connection to the requested CSLN is equal to the 
sensitivity level of the requesting application.  Upon receipt of the SCS request, the TCS 
will use the requested destination IP address of the connection to query the SCODB for 
the explicit sensitivity level of the requesting application.  Once the explicit sensitivity 
level is obtained, the TCS will use the destination IP address to query the TCDB for the 
explicit sensitivity level of the destination single-level network.  The TCS will verify that 
the sensitivity level of the outgoing connection is equal to the sensitivity level of the 
destination single-level network.  Once the connection is validated, the TCS will signal 
the SCS to continue processing the connection request through the networking stack. 
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2.3.1.3  Connection Termination 
The TCS shall be responsible for connection teardown.  Upon recognition 
that a connection is terminating between an untrusted MYSEA server process and the 
CSLN or upon timeout of the connection, the TCS shall delete the appropriate record 
associated with the connection from its corresponding database, SCIDB or SCODB, and 
send the PCC protocol handler a delete command to terminate its connection between the 
MYSEA server and the corresponding TCM. 
2.3.2 Secure Connection Server 
The SCS is a trusted daemon on the MYSEA server that is placed between the 
untrusted application protocol servers and the IP layer.  For a connection initiated by a 
single-level network, the SCS process will be started by the TCS upon the receipt of a 
new connection request.  For a connection started by a MYSEA LAN client, the SCS will 
be started by an existing MYSEA server daemon known as the “Trusted Path Server” [1].  
This daemon is responsible for initializing secure operations for each user logged into the 
MYSEA LAN.  The SCS provides two primary functions: one for inbound and the other 
for outbound connections. 
2.3.2.1  Inbound Processing 
The SCS maintains an open socket listening for incoming connections 
already processed by the TCS.  Once a connection is accepted, the SCS spawns a child 
process responsible for handling that connection.  The child process shall use the source 
IP address of the packet to query the SCIDB for the explicit sensitivity level of the 
connection.  The child process shall then spawn the requesting application protocol server 
at the explicit sensitivity level returned by the SCIDB query 
2.3.2.2  Outbound Processing 
The SCS also processes outbound traffic from the Application Protocol 
servers to the CSLNs.  Once a connection request is received, the SCS spawns a trusted 
child process responsible for that connection.  Similar to the PCC protocol handler, the 
child SCS will extract key data fields from the connection request and post that data to 
the SCODB for use by the TCS.   The child SCS shall create a new record in the SCODB 
for each new connection request.  It will be responsible for writing the requested 
destination IP address and the sensitivity level of the requesting process to the record.  
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Once complete, the child SCS will request the TCS to verify that the sensitivity level of 
the outbound request is equal to the sensitivity level of the destination single-level 
network.  Detailed data flow is provided below. 
2.3.2.2.1 
The child SCS process will receive the requested connection to a 
single-level network and create a new record in the SCODB.  The child SCS writes the 
sensitivity level of the requesting process and its requested destination IP address to the 
record. 
2.3.2.2.2 
If the write is successful, the child SCS process will make a 
request to the TCS for validation that the requested connection is to an authorized CSLN 
at the corresponding sensitivity level. 
2.3.2.2.3 
The TCS will use the destination IP address sent from the SCS to 
query the SCODB for the sensitivity level of the application requesting access to the 
CSLN.   The TCS will use the destination IP address to query the TCDB for the 
sensitivity level of the TCM providing security services for the requested CSLN.   
2.3.2.2.4 
The TCS will then validate that the sensitivity level of the 
requesting application and the sensitivity level of the requested CSLN are equal.  If equal, 
the TCS will return authorization to the SCS to continue processing the connection 
through the networking stack. 
2.3.3 Trusted Channel Database 
The TCDB is a static database which maintains an association among a TCM, its 
IP address, and the permitted IP address space for which the TCM provides security 
services.  The integrity of this database is crucial to the overall TSF of the MYSEA 
server.  Thus, all writes to this database shall be constrained only to authorized security 
administrators.  The TCDB shall be administered in accordance with the ∆ Property [7] 
as advocated by Fellows.  The TCDB shall allow read-only access and restrict that access 
to only the TCS and SCS. 
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2.3.4 Secure Connection Inbound Database 
The SCIDB is a dynamic database which is read and modified by the TCS and is 
read by the SCS.  No other processes are permitted to use the SCIDB interface.  Once 
again, the integrity of this database is crucial to the overall TSF of the MYSEA server.  
The SCIDB tracks information required to associate the explicit sensitivity level of a 
CSLN to an untrusted application server process.  For inbound connections, each record 
includes the original source IP address and the explicit sensitivity level associated with 
the TCM.   Upon connection teardown, the record in the SCIDB shall be deleted by the 
TCS. 
2.3.5 Secure Connection Outbound Database 
The SCODB is a dynamic database which is read and modified by both the SCS 
and TCS.  Again, the integrity of this database is crucial to the overall TSF of the 
MYSEA server.  The SCODB tracks information required to associate the sensitivity 
level of an untrusted application to a CSLN.  For outbound connections, these fields 
consist of the requested destination IP address and the sensitivity level of the requesting 
untrusted process.  Upon connection teardown, the record in the SCODB shall be deleted 
by the TCS. 
2.4 TRUSTED CHANNEL MODULE 
2.4.1 Trusted Channel Server 
The TCM TCS mirrors the functionality of the TCS on the MYSEA server for 
initiating, managing and terminating each PCC.  The TCS will also utilize the MYSEA 
Security Association protocol to bind all trusted channel connections between the TCM 
and MYSEA server.  
2.4.2 Network Address Translation Server 
The TCM will also provide a Network Address Translation (NAT) server.  The 
requirement for NAT was previously discussed in Section 2.1.  The TCM will perform 
dynamic NAT on all inbound packets and static NAT on all outbound packets.  
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3. TRUSTED CHANNEL MODULE TO MYSEA SERVER 
 MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS 
3.1 OVERVIEW 
The TCM provides the only path between the MYSEA server and one of its 
multiplexed CSLNs.  The TCM permits the MYSEA server to assign an explicit 
sensitivity level to all connections coming from a CSLN by attaching an implied 
sensitivity level to each incoming connection.  The PCC enables this functionality by 
positively authenticating each TCM and by extension, the CSLN for which it provides 
services.  By positively authenticating a TCM and its corresponding CSLN, an implied 
sensitivity level can be associated with the Internet Protocol (IP) routing address of the 
CSLN interface of the TCM. 
The NAT functionality incorporated into the TCM will provide the interface 
between the segmented IP space of each domain and the IP space used by the multilevel 
network.  The TCM shall serve as each single-level networks interface to the MYSEA 
servers.  As a result, the IP address of the TCM will be advertised in the single-level 
network in place of the IP address of the MYSEA server.  The TCM shall perform 
dynamic NAT [8] [9] for all inbound packets from the CSLN to the MYSEA server by 
translating the destination address of each packet from the TCM to the requested 
MYSEA server. 
A data flow analysis is presented in Figure 5. 
3.2 TCM INBOUND STATES 
The TCM will change states based upon the incoming connections it receives, its 
authorization to perform the requested NAT function and the security policy decisions 
made by the Security Policy Database (SPD) of the PCC protocol handler.  The following 
sections will discuss the various states of the TCM. 
3.2.1 TCM STATE VARIABLES 
The TCM includes three separate variables as shown in Table 1.  “Power” 
indicates that the TCM is either un-powered and dormant or powered and active.  “NAT” 
indicates successful translation from the restricted domain IP address block of the CSLN 
to the IP address block of the MYSEA server.  “Trusted Channel Operation” indicates an 
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established PCC with the MYSEA server.  These three variables provide 23 or eight 
possible states, of which, only four states are reachable. 
 
Description Values Abbreviation 
Power On/Off Power 
Network Address Translation Yes/No NAT 
Trusted Channel Operation Yes/No TCO 
 
Table 1. TCM State Variables 
 
3.2.2 TCM DISALLOWED STATES 
Four states are disallowed by the TCM as shown in Table 2.  In other words, no 
possibility exists to transition into these states.  
 
Power NAT TCO Reason for Disallowed State 
Off Yes No No Power 
Off No Yes No Power 
Off Yes Yes No Power 
On No Yes No TCO operations without NAT 
 
Table 2. TCM Disallowed States 
 
3.2.3 TCM ALLOWABLE STATES 
Four states are allowed by the TCM as show by Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 




State Number Power NAT TCO Name 
0 Off No No Power Off 
1 On No No Idle 
2 On Yes No NAT  
3 On Yes Yes TCO 
 




















TCM States for CSLN Inbound Communications
Power Off from any state 
returns TCM to state 0
An error produced at any state 
returns TCM to state 1
A connection termination 
command from the MYSEA 
server returns connection to 
state 1
 
Figure 3. TCM Allowable Inbound State Diagram 
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3.3 MYSEA SERVER CONNECTED SINGLE LEVEL NETWORK INBOUND 
STATES 
The MYSEA server has a large number of associated states when its complete 
TSF is considered.  This section will be restricted to both the disallowed and allowed 
states associated with its CSLN operations. 
3.3.1 MYSEA SERVER CONNECTED SINGLE LEVEL NETWORK 
STATES VARIABLES 
The MYSEA server CSLN functionality includes four separate variables as shown 
in Table 4.   “Power” indicates that the MYSEA server is either un-powered and dormant 
or powered and active.  “PCC Connected” represents initial IPsec connections between 
the MYSEA server and TCM.  “PCC Authenticated” represents a completed PCC and the 
successful association of the implicit sensitivity level of the connection to its explicit 
sensitivity level.  A successful association of the explicit sensitivity level consists of a 
successful TCS write of the inner PCC IP source address to the SCIDB, a trusted read of 
the sensitivity level of the TCM from the TCDB, followed by a trusted write of the 
sensitivity level of the TCM to the SCIDB.   “Trusted Operations” represents the SCS 
trusted read of the sensitivity level of the incoming communication from the SCIDB and 
the successful spawning of the requested application at the correct sensitivity level.  These 
four variables provide 24 or sixteen possible states, of which, only five states are 
reachable. 
 
Description Values Abbreviation 
Power On/Off Power 
PCC Connected Yes/No Connected 
PCC Authenticated Yes/No Authenticated 
Trusted Operations Yes/No Trusted 
 




3.3.2 MYSEA SERVER CONNECTED SINGLE LEVEL NETWORK 
DISALLOWED STATES 
The following eleven states are disallowed by the MYSEA server CSLN 
operations as shown in Table 5.  In other words, no possibility exists to transition into 
these states.  
 
Power Connected Authenticated Trusted Reason 
Off N N Y No Power 
Off N Y N No Power 
Off Y N N No Power 
Off N Y Y No Power 
Off Y N Y No Power 
Off Y Y N No Power 
Off Y Y Y No Power 
On N N Y 
No Trusted without Connected and 
Authenticated 
On N Y N No Authenticated without Connected
On N Y Y 
No Authenticated and Trusted  
without Connected 
On  Y N Y No Trusted  without Authenticated 
 
Table 5.  MYSEA Server CSLN Disallowed States 
 
3.3.3 MYSEA SERVER CONNECTED SINGLE LEVEL NETWORK 
ALLOWED STATES 
The following five states are allowed by the MYSEA server CSLN as show by 





State Number Power Connected Authenticated Trusted Reason 
0 Off N N N Power Off 
1 On N N N Idle 
2 On Y N N Connected 
3 On Y Y N Authenticated 
4 On Y Y Y Trusted  
 


























Power Off from any state 
returns MYSEA Server to 
state 0
An error produced at any  
state returns MYSEA server  
to  state 1
A connection termination 
command from the MYSEA 
server returns specified 
connection to state 1
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4. MYSEA SERVER TO TRUSTED CHANNEL MODULE 
 MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS 
4.1 OVERVIEW 
The MYSEA server and TCM sustain a peer-to-peer relationship for initiating 
connections.  The MYSEA server shall retain the capability to initiate connections 
through dedicated single level network interfaces.  Additionally, the MYSEA server shall 
provide the capability to initiate connections through MLS network interfaces.  These 
interfaces shall be capable of multiplexing a large number of connections at multiple 
sensitivity levels to a large number of TCMs.  The creation of a trusted channel is the key 
component required for the MYSEA server to provide an MLS network interface.  The 
MYSEA server invokes a mandatory access control (MAC) check to ensure the 
sensitivity level of the process requesting the outbound connection is equivalent to the 
sensitivity level of the intended CSLN.  Once the MAC check is completed, the PCC is 
initiated to provide the required trusted channel necessary to provide a connection 
through an MLS network interface.  Due to the aforementioned DoD IP space 
restrictions, the TCM will perform static source NAT [8] [9] for all outbound connections 
from the MYSEA server to the CSLN.   
The TCM shall perform static NAT for all outbound communication from the 
MYSEA server to the CSLN by conducting a one to one swap of the source IP address 
from the MYSEA server to that of the source IP address of the TCM.  A data flow 
analysis is presented in Figure 8. 
4.2 MYSEA SERVER CONNECTED SINGLE LEVEL NETWORK 
OUTBOUND STATES 
The CSLN operations of the MYSEA server will change states based upon its 
outbound connections and the decisions made with respect to those connections by its 
PCC SPD.  The following sections will discuss the various states of the MYSEA server. 
4.2.1 MYSEA SERVER CONNECTED SINGLE LEVEL NETWORK 
STATES VARIABLES 
The MYSEA server CSLN functionality includes four separate variables as shown 
in Table 7.   “Power” indicates that the MYSEA server is either un-powered and dormant 
or powered and active.  “Trusted CSLN Operations Authorized” represents an untrusted 
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process accessing the SCS to initiate a valid CSLN connection.  The SCS shall write the 
sensitivity level of the process and requested destination IP address to the SCODB.  The 
SCS shall then request the TCS to query the SCODB with the destination IP address to 
obtain the explicit sensitivity level of the requesting application protocol server.  The TCS 
shall then query the TCDB with the destination IP address of the requested connection to 
obtain the explicit sensitivity level of the destination TCM.  The TCS shall perform a 
MAC equivalence check and verify that the sensitivity level of the server is equal to the 
sensitivity level of the requested CSLN.  “PCC Connected” represents initial IPsec 
communications between the MYSEA server and TCM.  “Trusted Channel 
Authenticated” represents an authenticated PCC.  These four variables provide 24 or 
sixteen possible states, of which, only five states are reachable. 
4.2.2 MYSEA SERVER CONNECTED SINGLE LEVEL NETWORK 
DISALLOWED STATES 
Eleven states are disallowed by the MYSEA server CSLN operations as shown in 
Table 8.  In other words, no possibility exists to transition into these states.  
 
Description Values Abbreviation 
Power On/Off Power 
Trusted CSLN Operations Authorized Yes/No Authorized  
PCC Connected Yes/No Connected 
Trusted Channel Authenticated Yes/No Authenticated 
 







Power Authorized Connected Authenticated Reason 
Off N N Y No Power 
Off N Y N No Power 
Off Y N N No Power 
Off N Y Y No Power 
Off Y N Y No Power 
Off Y Y N No Power 
Off Y Y Y No Power 
On N N Y 
No Authenticated without 
Connected and Authorized 
On N Y N 
No Connected without 
Authorized 
On N Y Y 
No Connected and 
Authenticated without 
Authorized 
On  Y N Y 
No Authenticated without 
Connected 
 
Table 8.  MYSEA Server CSLN Disallowed States 
 
4.2.3 MYSEA SERVER CONNECTED SINGLE LEVEL NETWORK 
ALLOWED STATES 
The following five states are allowed by the MYSEA server CSLN as show by 








State Number Power Authorized Connected Authenticated Reason 
0 Off N N N Power Off 
1 On N N N Idle 
2 On Y N N Authorized 
3 On Y Y N Connected 
4 On Y Y Y Authenticated 
 
 









4.3 TCM OUTBOUND STATES 
The TCM will change states based on its ability to negotiate and operate a 
successful PCC and on its ability to perform NAT operations on the incoming packet.  
The following sections will discuss the various states of the TCM. 
4.3.1 TCM STATE VARIABLES 
The TCM includes three separate variables as shown in Table 10.  “Power” 
indicates that the TCM is either un-powered and dormant or powered and active.  
“Trusted Channel Operation” indicates an established PCC with the MYSEA server.  
“NAT” indicates a successful source NAT from the IP address of the MYSEA server to 
the IP address of the TCM.  These three variables provide 23 or eight possible states, of 
which, only four states are reachable. 
 
Description Values Abbreviation 
Power On/Off Power 
Trusted Channel Operation Yes/No TCO 
Network Address Translation Yes/No NAT 
 
Table 10. TCM State Variables 
 
4.3.2 TCM DISALLOWED STATES 
The following four states are disallowed by the TCM as shown in Table 11.  In 
other words, no possibility exists to transition into these states.  
 
Power TCO NAT Reason for Disallowed State 
Off Yes No No Power 
Off No Yes No Power 
Off Yes Yes No Power 
On No Yes No NAT operations without TCO 
 
Table 11. TCM Disallowed States 
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4.3.3 TCM ALLOWABLE STATES 
The following four states are allowed by the TCM as show by Table 12 and 
illustrated in Figure 7.   
 
State Number Power TCO NAT Name 
0 Off No No Power Off 
1 On No No Idle 
2 On Yes No Trusted Operations 
3 On Yes Yes NAT Operations 
 




Power Off from any state 
returns TCM to state 0
An error produced at any state 
returns TCM to state 1
A connection termination 
command from the MYSEA 























TCM States for Outbound CSLN Communications
 




Figure 8. MYSEA Server to TCM Flow Chart 
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX A ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND DEFINITIONS 
 
A.1 Abbreviations, Acronyms 
 
AH   IP Authentication Header Protocol 
CSLN   MYSEA Connected Single Level Network(s) 
DoD   Department of Defense 
ESP   IP Encapsulating Security Payload Protocol 
JWICS  Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 
MAC   Mandatory Access Control 
MLS   Multilevel Security 
 MYSEA  Monterey Security Architecture 
 NAT   Network Address Translation 
 NIPRNET NonSecure Internet Protocol Router Network 
 NIC   Network Information Center 
PCC   Protected Communications Channel 
SCIDB Secure Connection Inbound Database 
SCODB Secure Connection Outbound Database 
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network 
SCS   Secure Connection Server 
TCM   Trusted Channel Module 
TCS   Trusted Channel Server 
TCDB   Trusted Channel Database  
TSF   Target of Evaluation Security Function 







2.12 ∆ Property:  Requires all security-related modification to the MLS 
distributed architecture to be made only by explicitly authorized trusted agents [7]. 
2.13 Connected Single Level Network (CSLN):  The segment of the MYSEA 
architecture from the MYSEA server to its supported TCMs responsible for providing 
single level network connectivity to the MYSEA server. 
2.14 Security Bundle:  An IPsec security association that invokes both the 
Authentication Header protocol and the IP Encapsulating Security Payload protocol onto 
one IP packet [10].  
2.15 Sensitivity Level:  The combined classification of data based upon its 
security or classification level and integrity level. 
2.16 Target of Evaluation (TOE):  An IT product or system and its associated 
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation [3]. 
2.17 TOE Security Functions (TSF):  A set consisting of all hardware, 
software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement 
of the TSP [3]. 
2.18 TOE Security Policy (TSP):  A set of rules that regulate how assets are 
managed, protected and distributed within a TOE [3]. 
2.19 Trusted channel:  A means by which a TSF and a remote trusted IT 
product can communicate with necessary confidence to support the TSP [3]. 
2.20 Trusted Channel Module:  Security device required to enable “Inter-TSF 
Trusted Channels” between the MYSEA server and its authorized single level network. 
2.21 Tunnel Mode:  A security association applied to an IP tunnel, with the 
access controls applied to the headers of the traffic inside the tunnel [10]. 
117 
APPENDIX B REFERENCES 
 
[1] J. D. Wilson, "A Trusted Connection Framework for Multilevel Secure Local 
Area Networks", Naval Postgraduate School, June 2000. 
 
[2] C. E. Irvine, T. E. Levin, T. D. Nguyen, D. Shifflett, J. Khosalim, P. C. Clark, A. 
Wong, F. Afinidad, D. Bibighaus, and J. Sears, "Overview of a High Assurance 
Architecture for Distributed Multilevel Security", Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE 
Systems Man and Cybernetics Information Assurance Workshop, West Point, 
NY, June 2004, pp. 38-45. 
 
[3] "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Volume I", 
CCIMB-2004-01-001, Version 2.2 ed: International Organization for 
Standardization, January 2004. 
 
[4] DigitalNet Government Solutions LLC, "XTS-400 Trusted Computer System 
Technical Overview", Herndon, VA, July 2004, 
http://www.digitalnet.com/solutions/info_sec_sol/xts400_trusted_sys.htm, 
           15 July 04. 
 
[5] Defense Information Systems Agency, "SIPRNET Classification Guide". 
 
[6] J. D. Sears, "Protected Communications Channel Protocol Requirements 
Document," Appendix B, "Simultaneous Connection Management and Protection 
in a Distributed Multilevel Security Environment", Masters Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September 2004. 
 
[7] J. Fellows, J. Hemenway, N. Kelem, and S. Romero, "The Architecture of a 
Distributed Trusted Computing Base", Proceedings of the 10th National 
Conference on Computer Security, pp. 68-77, September 1987. 
 
[8] Cisco Systems Inc "How NAT Works, Document ID: 6450", 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_tech_note09186a008
0094831.shtml, 5 August 2004. 
 
[9] K. Srisuresh and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network Address Translator 
(Traditional NAT), RFC 3022", Network Working Group, IETF, January 2001. 
 
[10] S. Kent and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol, Draft-IETF-

















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
119 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
[1] Department of Defense, "Information Assurance," ASD/C3I, DODD 8500.1, 
October 2002. 
 
[2] "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Volume I", 
CCIMB-2004-01-001, Version 2.2 ed: International Organization for 
Standardization, January 2004. 
 
[3] "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Volume II", 
CCIMB-2004-01-002, Version 2.2 ed: International Organization for 
Standardization, January 2004. 
 
[4] Department of Defense, "Trusted Network Interpretation of the TCSEC", 
National Computer Security Center, NCSC-TG-005, July 1987. 
 
[5] J. D. Wilson, "A Trusted Connection Framework for Multilevel Secure Local 
Area Networks", Naval Postgraduate School, June 2000. 
 
[6] C. E. Irvine, D. Shifflett, P. C. Clark, T. E. Levin, and G. W. Dinolt, "MYSEA 
Security Architecture," Naval Postgraduate School Center for Information System 
Security Studies and Research, NPS-CS-02-006, May 2002. 
 
[7] C. E. Irvine, T. E. Levin, J. D. Wilson, D. Shifflett, and B. Pereira, "An Approach 
to Security Requirements Engineering for a High Assurance System", 
Requirements Engineering, Vol. 7. No. 4, May 2002, pp. 192-208. 
 
[8] C. E. Irvine, T. E. Levin, T. D. Nguyen, D. Shifflett, J. Khosalim, P. C. Clark, A. 
Wong, F. Afinidad, D. Bibighaus, and J. Sears, "Overview of a High Assurance 
Architecture for Distributed Multilevel Security", Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE 
Systems Man and Cybernetics Information Assurance Workshop, West Point, 
NY, June 2004, pp. 38-45. 
 
[9] DigitalNet Government Solutions LLC, "XTS-400 Trusted Computer System 
Technical Overview", Herndon, VA, July 2004, 
http://www.digitalnet.com/solutions/info_sec_sol/xts400_trusted_sys.htm, 
           15 July 04. 
 
[10] Department of Defense, "Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria", National 
Computer Security Center, DoD 5200.28-STD, December 1985. 
 
[11] D. E. Bell and L. LaPadula, "Secure Computer System: Unified Exposition and 




[12] K. J. Biba, "Integrity Considerations for Secure Computer Systems", MITRE 
Corp., Tech. Rep. ESD-TR-76-372, 1977. 
 
[13] Irvine, Cynthia E., Levin, Timothy E., Nguyen, Thuy D., and Dinolt, George W., 
"The Trusted Computing Exemplar Project", Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE 
Systems Man and Cybernetics Information Assurance Workshop, West Point, 
NY, June 2004, pp. 109 - 115. 
 
[14] J. C. Williams and M. L. Day, "Sensitivity Labels and Security Profiles", 
Proceedings of the Eleventh National Computer Security Profiles, October 1988.  
 
[15] S. B. Lipner, "Non-Discretionary Controls for Commercial Applications", 1982 
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, April 1982. 
 
[16] J. Fellows, J. Hemenway, N. Kelem, and S. Romero, "The Architecture of a 
Distributed Trusted Computing Base", Proceedings of the 10th National 
Conference on Computer Security, pp. 68-77, September 1987. 
 
[17] C. Weissman, "BLACKER: Security for the DDN, Examples of A1 Security 
Engineering Trades", 1992 IEEE Computer Society symposium on Research in 
Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, May 1992, pp. 286-292.  
 
[18] M. Vetterling, G. Wimmel, and A. Wisspeintner, "Secure Systems Development 
Based on the Common Criteria: The PalME Project", ACM SIGSOFT 2002 
Software Engineering Notes, Charleston, SC, 2002, pp. 129-138. 
 
[19] National Security Agency Information Assurance Directorate," Consistency 
Instruction Manual for Development of US Government Protection Profiles (PP) 
for use in Medium Robustness Environments", Release 2.0, March 2004. 
 
[20] Cisco Systems Inc., "Security Target for Cisco IOS/IPSEC", Version: 3.7, San 
Jose, CA, 16 September 2002. 
 
[21] National Security Agency Information Assurance Directorate, "U.S. Government 
Protection Profile for Separation Kernels in Environments Requiring High 
Robustness", Version 0.621, July 2004. 
 
[22] J. D. Sears, "Connected Single Level Network System Requirements Document", 
Appendix A, "Simultaneous Connection Management and Protection in a 
Distributed Multilevel Security Environment", Masters Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California September 2004. 
 
[23] J. D. Sears, "Connected Single Level Network Trusted Channel Management 
Requirements Document", Appendix C, "Simultaneous Connection Management 
and Protection in a Distributed Multilevel Security Environment", Masters Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September 2004. 
121 
 
[24] K. Srisuresh and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network Address Translator 
(Traditional NAT), RFC 3022", Network Working Group, IETF, January 2001. 
 
[25] C. Kaufman, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol, draft-ietf-ipsec-
ikev2-11.txt," IP Security Protocol Working Group, IETF, October 2003. 
 
[26] J. D. Sears, "Protected Communications Channel Protocol Requirements 
Document", Appendix B, "Simultaneous Connection Management and Protection 
in a Distributed Multilevel Security Environment", Masters Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September 2004. 
 
[27] S. Kent and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol, Draft-IETF-
IPsec-RFC2401BIS-01", IP Security Protocol Working Group, IETF, July 2004. 
 
[28] Defense Information Systems Agency, "SIPRNET Classification Guide." 
 
[29] S. Kent, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), RFC 2406", Network 
Working Group, IETF, November 1998. 
 
[30] S. Kent, "IP Authentication Header, RFC 2402", Network Working Group, IETF, 
November 1998. 
 
[31] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Federal Information Processing 
Standards Publication 197 Announcing the Advanced Encryption Standard", 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf, November 2001. 
 
[32] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Federal Information Processing 
Standards Publication 180-2 Announcing the Secure Hash Standard", 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf, August 2002. 
 
[33] Department of Defense, "Directive C-5200.5 Communications Security", 21 April 
1990.  
 
[34] T. Li, B. Cole, P. Morton, and D. Li, "Cisco Hot Standby Router Protocol 

















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
123 
 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
3. Susan Alexander 
National Security Agency 
Fort Meade, MD 
 
4. George Bieber 
Office of Secretary of Defense 
Washington, DC 
 
5. RADM Joseph Burns 
Commander Naval Security Group 
Fort George Meade, MD 
 
6. CAPT Mike Brown 
Naval Information Warfare Activity 
FT George Meade, MD 
 
7. Deborah Cooper 
DC Associates, LLC 
Roslyn, VA 
 
8. CAPT Timothy V. Flynn 
SPAWAR Systems Center, San Diego 
San Diego, CA 
 
9. CDR Daniel L. Currie 
SPAWAR PMW 161 
San Diego, CA 
 
10. Rita Painter 














13. Dr. Diana Gant 
National Science Foundation 
 
14. Jennifer Guild 
SPAWAR Systems Center, Charleston 
Charleston, SC 
  
15. Richard Hale 
Defense Information Systems Agency 
Falls Church, VA 
 
16. LCDR Scott  D. Heller 
SPAWAR, PMW-161 
San Diego, CA 
 
17. Wiley Jones 
Office of Secretary of Defense 
Washington, DC 
 








20. Dr. Carl Landwehr 
 National Science Foundation 
Arlington, VA 
 
21. Steve LaFountain 
 National Security Agency 
Fort Meade, MD 
 





23. Penny Lehtola 
National Security Agency 
Fort Meade, MD 
 
24. Ernest Lucier 
Federal Aviation Administration 
Washington, DC 
 
25. CAPT Sheila McCoy 
Headquarters U.S. Navy 
Arlington, VA 
 
26. Dr. Vic Maconachy 
National Security Agency 
Fort Meade, MD 
 
27. Doug Maughan 
Department of Homeland Security 
Washington, DC 
 




29. John Mildner 
SPAWAR Systems Center, Charleston 
Charleston, SC 
 




31. P.J. Jenket 
SPAWAR Systems Center, Charleston 
Charleston, SC 
 
32. Keith Schwalm 
Good Harbor Consulting, LLC 
Washington, DC 
 
33. Dr. Ralph Wachter 












36. Daniel Wolf 
 National Security Agency 
Fort Meade, MD 
 




38. Mr. Lew Gutman 
SPAWAR Systems Center, San Diego 
San Diego, CA 
  
39. Dr. Cynthia E. Irvine 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
40. Thuy D. Nguyen 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
41. LT Joseph D. Sears 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
  
 
